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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to attempt to show that
ideology acted as a motive force of significant importance
on political action in the 1950s.

The argument is not

general; instead, it is specifically limited to the British
Labour party during the years from 1951 to 1959.

It thus

covers the life span of only two parliaments.
It will be maintained in Chapter II that the important
socialist theories, dealt with in Chapter I, were the pri
mary base upon which the rival party factions, fundamental
ists and revisionists, formulated their desired policy aims.
In Chapter III it will be argued that these factions were
able to influence the party leadership to a significant
degree.

The analysis will show that the policy of a major

Western political party was heavily influenced by pre
viously formulated theories and ideologies.

Ill
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INTRODUCTION
It has become fashionable in recent years among socio
logists and political scientists of the behavioral persuasion
to deprecate the influence of ideology on political action.
Over the last decade several works have been published which
deal extensively with what their authors see as the end of
ideological influence on political action in the West.

The

theorists responsible for this argument first became promi
nent in the mid-1950's.

Edward Shils’ article, "The End of

Ideology?" published in the Nov., 1955 issue of Encounter
and Lewis Feuer's article, "Beyond Ideology" published in
the same year reached almost identical conclusions.^

Shils'

essay resulted from "The Future of Freedom" Conference held
in Milan, Italy in Sept. of 1955 under the auspices of the
Congress for Cultural Freedom.

It was attended by various

intellectuals and politicians from North America and Europe.
The ideological issues dividing left and right had
been reduced [by the majority of those attending
the conference] to a little more or a little less
government ownership and economic planning. No one
seemed to believe that it really made much dif
ference which political party controlled the domes
tic policy of individual n a t i o n s . 2
The reasons given for the decline of ideological influence
centered around man's proven ability to solve the political

1 Encounter. 5 (Nov., 1955), 52-58. and Psychoanalysis
and Ethics (Springfield, 1955), 126-130.
2 S.M. Lipset, Political Man (New York, 1963), p. 4kl.

1
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and social problems of the Industrial Revolution.

Such fac

tors as the conservative acceptance of the Welfare State, the
decline of class distinctions, and the reduction of economic
inequalities and privileges are examples of the factors cited
as being at work.

Daniel Bell has argued along similar lines:

In the Western world, therefore, there is today a
rough consensus ... on political issues: the ac
ceptance of a Welfare State; the desirability of
decentralized power; a system of mixed economy
and of political pluralism ... the ideological
age has ended.3
The purpose of this thesis is very limited in scope when
compared with that of the theory dealt with above; although
it does have as its object the desire to discover whether
ideology had any influence on policy formation in the 1950s.
The argument is not general; instead, it is specifically
limited to the British Labour party during the years from 1951
to 1959.
ments.

It thus covers the life span of only two parlia

The argument presented is in no way meant to be a

total refutation of the general "End of Ideology" theory. In
stead, its purpose is simply to show that ideological in
fluences on policy formation were, in this one case, of sig
nificant importance.

It will be maintained that the general

socialist theories dealt with in the early sections were the
primary base upon which the rival factions in the party
formulated their desired policy aims.

It will be further

argued that these factions were able to influence the party

3 Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (New York, I 962) p.
402.
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leadership and, as a result, the official policy of the
party; thus illustrating that the policy of a major Western
political party was heavily influenced by previously formu
lated theories and ideologies.^

4 The policies of the factions, the revisionists and
fundamentalists, are dealt with, at length, in Chapter II.
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CHAPTER I

THE LABOUR PARTY AND SOCIALIST THEORY
The passage of time inevitably distorts the commentator's
understanding of political ideas as a result of cultural and
group socialization.

Yet, at the same time, it aids analysis

by providing a conceptual frameworm and a certain amount of
detachment.

The political theorist himself is limited in a

similar way; he is at the same time moulded by and the mould
er of his environment.

And, as a result, his primary aim is

often the justification of a specific policy; only then comes
statistical and historical evidence in support.

Although it

has become fashionable since the publication of David Easton's
The Political System in 1953 to decry historicism in politi
cal theory, it is not unprofitable for the commentator to
attempt to isolate core ideas and examine them in their re
lation to given circumstances, as well as using them as a
tool of analysis in determining one's own moral preconceptions
or determining the validity of the theory.^

Ideas can serve

as a primary motive force in political activity and any at
tempt to isolate the causes of such activity must, of neces
sity, include a certain type of research which Easton would
lable historical.
"The power of the philosopher lies in that he can stir
up great waves of feeling and agitation.

His helplessness

5 New York, 1953.
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is due to his inability to control the farther waves of his
thought."^

As an instrument of historical causality a theory

becomes important when emotions and interests can be given
shape and support through it.

There is no guarantee that the

most logical or best suited theory will find large scale ac
ceptance,

Instead, influence on political action depends on

the theory's appeal to ethical needs.

When such comes to be

the case the theory tends to become an ideology and this leads
to a significant increase in its influence on political be
havior.^

The degree of influence of any ideology is a func

tion of its ability to enlist support and this, in turn, is a
function of organization.
British Socialism provides a relevant area for the study
of political theory in this light.

The connection here be

tween theory and influence is striking.

No attempt will be

made to give a critique of various theories; information as
to where such analysis can be found is provided in several
notes.

Rather, an attempt will be made to trace the develop

ment of socialist thought from the latter half of the nine
teenth century to the mid-twentieth century and to isolate the
core of the theories.

Secondly, an attempt will be made to

6 Adam.Ulam, The Philosophical Foundations of English
Socialism (Cambridge, Mass., I 951), p. 130.
7 Ideology is here defined as a pattern of beliefs which
imply an end for political action and which require an ir
rational commitment to certain ideas as being absolute. This
definition is adopted from Eugene J. Meehan, The British Left
Wing and Foreign Policy (New Brunswick, New Jersey, I 96O), p. 1.
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show what core values became the basis for ideology.^

The

purpose of this is to isolate the ideas which had a signifi
cant effect on the ideological direction of the fundamentalist
and revisionist factions in the Labour party during the 1951-

1959 period.

The present chapter provides an explication of

the core values of the major influential schools of British
Socialist thought.

Chapter II discusses the conditions sur

rounding the development of the factions and provides an
explanation of the basic positions of these groups.

The lat

ter were derived, in the main, from the theories dealt with
in Chapter I.
It should be noted that the elements embodied in the
Socialism of the Labour party sprang from many diverse and
independent sources which are not dealt with here.

And while

all of these, in some respect, had a degree of influence on the
factions in some cases it was marginal, while in others many
of the earlier significant strands of thought were filtered,
refined, and modified by the later groups.

It is sufficient,

therefore, for present purposes to take up the story of
Socialist development with T.H. Green.

The Pre-War Theorists
It should first be noted that despite the diversity of
theory, the similarity of core values within the elements in

8 A note of caution should be added concerning the dif
ferences between theory and ideology. While ideology obviously
derives from theory and becomes only a crude representation of
it, a precise line between the two is difficult to draw.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the party, tempered by British pragmatism, led to a remarkable
cohesion in policy formation during the inter-war period. This
should be kept in mind in order to provide a proper perspective,
as differences among Socialist theorists did not necessarily
reflect corresponding cleavages among major elements in the
party.

It was only with the Keynsian generation that the means-

end controversy in British socialism came to the fore in a sig
nificant way.

Aside from the above factors, it was perhaps the

early fervor of a new creed, the exclusion from office in the
form of majority government, the fact that not even basic policy
had been implemented, and the sobering effect of government
with a majority in the 1945-51 period which postponed the ideo
logical controversy until the 1950s.
After 1951 the revisionists sought to claim that Socialism
was primarily a social ethic, but the Labour party's commitment
to Socialism had been far more than that, as it united a social
ethic with a definite view of the nature of the existing social
system and the means which had to be taken to transform it.
Central to the whole concept was fellowship, which went far
beyond radicalism and reformism; collectivism had begun to make
significant advancement in its replacement of individualism.
Emphasis was put on the welfare and happiness of the community,
as In the new society the isolation of self would be abolished.
It would be incorrect to argue that the bulk of the party went
this far but this was definitely the direction of the re
orientation of thought.

In addition to restating the values

of the community such an ethica? theory became part of the
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principle guiding lines of Socialist economics; the profit
motive was to be replaced by fellowship.

It was 'the system'

which was at fault and common ownership was the answer to the
existing ills of society.

As a result, 1918 saw the adoption

of the party constitution with its much criticized and lauded
Clause 4.^

There are numerous references available to prove

that this was part of the basic beliefs of all Socialists. In

1909 Ernest Bevin stated;
... you will realize the chaos, misery and degrada
tion brought upon us by the private ownership of the
means of life.
I claim that Socialism which is the
common ownership of these means, is the only solu
tion of such e v i l s . 10
In 1933 Herbert Morrison (later Lord Morrison) wrote;
The function of Labour Governments in the future
will rather be to secure the socialization of in
dustry after industry under a management which can
be broadly relied upon to go on with its work.II
The party wanted drastic change but it was, at the same time,
gradualist and devoted to parliamentary means; further, in
Parliament the large bulk of its policies were reformist and
brought with them the hope of immediate material benefits.
However, throughout the inter-war period in its three major

9 "To secure for the producers by hand and brain the full
fruits of their industry, and the most equitable distribution
thereof that may be possible, upon the basis of the common own
ership of the means of production and the best obtainable sys
tem of popular administration and control of each industry or
service." Quoted in Henry Felling, A Short History of the
Labour Party (London, 1965), p. 44.
10 Quoted in Alan Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest
Bevin (London, I960), p. 21
11 Quoted in S.H. Beer, British Politics in the Collecti
vist Age (New Yo^k, 1965), pT?:0.
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policy statements Labour reiterated its belief in the necessity
of nationalization for the realization of the Socialist Commonwealth.
T.H. Green's revision of liberal theory resulted in the
obliteration of the usual lines of demarcation between poli
tics and economics; economic phenomena had great relevance,
Green argued, as social factors Influencing human behavior and
they should be considered in their ethical relationship to man
in society.

Green's influence, along with Mill's,brought

liberalism from its negative view of the state to a positive
one.

The effect of legislation on the welfare of the com

munity now became the standard of judgement.

In a sense, how

ever, the change was not so drastic when it is viewed as an
extension of the utilitarian theory of the greatest happiness
1p
suitably modified by Mill.
Green's theory of liberalism had
a certain affinity to a moderate brand of Socialism and the
Oxford Idealist and Fabian movements probably represented a
social reaction against the same inefficiencies in the system.
Although it is difficult to call certain elements in poli
tical theory Fabian because of the diversity of views held by
the most prominent members of that group, there can be little
doubt that utilitarian influences were substantial.

Logically

enough, the utilitarian trend led to a significant emphasis
being placed on efficiency at the expense of social justice.
Equality was at least as important as fraternity in Fabian

12 For a more detailed account of the influence of T.H.
Green see George Sabine, A History of Political Theory (New
York, 196 l), pp. 735-4-0.
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thought and. this becomes strikingly apparent when one compares
the Fabian society with such groups as the Independent Labour
Party (ILP).
rationalistic.

Fabianism tended to be far more middle class and
Liberty played its role in Fabian theory, but

it was connected with an organic conception of society, having
heavy Platonic and Hegelian overtones.

This organic character

of Fabian Socialism should not be seen as being similar to
Fascism.

The whole organic concept of society in evolution,

due in no small part to Darwinian influences, was widely ac
cepted at the time, and it is only in connection with positive
recommendations that such thought can be labelled totalitarian
or democratic.

It was, in large part, as a reaction against

individualistic liberalism that the Fabians stressed social
unity.

But at the same time it was usually maintained that

liberty was intimately related to leisure.

Work, Bernard Shaw

maintained, was compulsory; and if hours of work could be
shortened liberty would thereby be increased.

This argument

and its implications regarding the governmental sphere of acti
vity shows that Fabian socialism was in no sense totalitarian.
Further, it illustrates a curious ambivalence with regard to
the idea of freedom.

Both freedom as the absence of restraint

and freedom as autonomy exist side by side throughout British
socialist thought, forming a curious mixture of collectivism
and individualism, one predominating in some cases the other in
others.
The Fabians' dislike of capitalism did not lead them to
support abrupt or violent measures; rather, it is difficult to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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overemphasize the caution with which they advocated change.
Sidney Webb argued that change must be democratic, gradual,
constitutional, and morally acceptable to the masses.

How

ever there could be no doubt that the expropriators of econo
mic rent were to be abolished as a class by means of taxation
and that the ownership of major industries was to be taken
over by the state.

Yet, in the bulk of Fabian proposals there

are few propositions which are not in the mainstream of, or
a logical result of previous developments in Radical thought.
In 1889 the Fabian Essays in Socialism were

published.

This volume served to establish the Society as an important
force and to distinguish it from Marxism and the semianarchism of the Socialist League,

Fabian theory saw Socialism

as inevitable because of the nature of economic evolution. The
pressure of the electorate, it was argued in the Essays, would
speed up this tendency especially as the masses became in
creasingly aware of their power to mould society.

Progress

already made by means of public awareness and the ballot were
sufficient to show that this would continue to be the case in
the future.

The transition from feudalism to capitalism had

been one of long, slow progress just as the present transition
was and would be.

Similarity to Marxism is found in the em

phasis on economic concentration which, for the Fabians however,
served to bring closer and make easier the transfer of mono-

13 Sidney Webb, et al., Fabian Essays in Socialism
(London, I889).
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polies and oligopolies to the public sector not through re
volution but through a mixture of nationalization, taxation,
and compensation.

Part of the argument was based on social

justice, the other on utility (in the sense of increased
efficiency) in an effort to gain the support of the elec
torate for such a move.

Since Socialism was to be attained

only gradually, compensation seemed normal, but it was to be
paid

out of taxés on economic rent so that the collectivity

would not have to suffer.

Land was to be taken over by local

public agencies rather than a national one, while in other
fields these local agencies were to establish enterprises in
competition with the private sector.

It was felt that since

these government owned enterprises would not be concerned
with profit, they would be able to undercut capitalist prices;
and, because they would offer better conditions of work, the
best labour would drift towards them.

The idea that workers

in the public sector should control their industries was re
jected; instead, public boards or commissions were to be
established.!^

The central criticism of capitalist society

seemed to be not that the rich were rich and the poor were
poor but rather, that economic control gave vast power to a
small number of individuals.
The ILP, which came to the fore in the Liberal-Labour

l4 G.D.H. Cole, A History of Socialist Thought (London,

1953- 58), III, pp. 118-119. Hereafter cited as Socialist
Thought.
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period, was formed by members of several diverse groups,
particularly the Social Democratic Federation (SDF), the
Fabians, and elements in the Scottish Labour party. The trade
unions remained cool despite continued attempts by the party
to convince them that membership would be to their interest.
But the ILP began to make advances in the same manner the
Fabians had, by running candidates in local elections and
using its position on the councils to advocate concrete and
immediate reforms in such fields as education and slum clear
ance.

It was this type of policy that gained support for the

party as it came to be seen as a reform group rather than a
revolutionary movement.

In the short run Radical measures

were the aim but the ILP never abandoned its Socialist pur
pose, which it defined at its Bradford Conference of 1893 as
"the collective ownership of the means of production, distri
bution and e x c h a n g e . Y e t

the party’s immersion in reform

led it to make a distinction between such short-run partial
reforms, and long-run structural reforms which required the
abolition of capitalism for their, implementation.

Thus, while

the state should attempt to find work for the unemployed, the
elimination of unemployment was not possible under capitalism,
and while slums might be cleared the elimination of poverty
would require the adoption of a collectivist position and the
abolition of the profit motive.
The stress in this period tended, however, to be ethical

15 Ibid., pp. 157-158.
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rather than economic.

The whole movement was utopian in as

piration, concerned with the betterment of the bottom stratum
of society.

It was a movement almost totally devoid of doc

trine and, thus, while party theorists listened to the Fabians
with their explanations concerning the efficiency of national
ization their major concern was social justice.
This ILP type of Socialism was part of a much wider
movement, for the most part not Socialist at all,
of revulsion against the manifest evils of indus
trial society and, in particular, against the sharp
contrast between the rapidly growing wealth of
British society, regarded as a whole, and the appal
ling squalor and wretchedness of a large section of
the population in London and other great cities.1°
Guild Socialism which came to prominence/the same period
as the ILP, was part of a general European trend of thought in
the pre-World War I era.

This pluralism or theory of decen

tralized authority has been described as "the last significant
attempt in political theory to deny the importance of the
state."17

While atomistic individualism once held sway, it

was rapidly declining, and pluralism was seen to be a compro
mise between this individualism and pure collectivism. Certain
ideas in pluralist thought were particularly appealing because
of their attempt to combine the security of collectivism with
the fear of state authority.

Such a position, however, neg

lects significant social needs and by itself constitutes a
rather weak argument in favour of the re-organization of so
ciety.

But when combined with elements characteristic of

16 Ibid.. p. 179.
17 11am, p. 81.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

15

other types of what was then contemporary, and particularly
socialist, thought it attains a much greater degree of signi
ficance,

Thus Harold Laski in his early period attempted to

reconcile group interests and thereby prevent the evils of in
dividualism appearing in a new form.

Laski admitted that al

legiance to the state was more important than allegiance to
the group, but argued that alternative loyalties were neces
sary,

If the will of groups and government conflicted, it was

argued, the victor should be the party whose interests were
directed towards the common good.

The means used to identify

the body which had the common good in mind was, interestingly
enough, never revealed.
Guild Socialism aimed at replacing centralized economic
controls with local ones.

It gained the bulk of its impor

tance after World War I and was primarily the result of intel
lectual inspiration.

Fabians, Christian Socialists, anarchists,

and Oxford intellectuals were all represented in this group,
whose central aim seemed to be based on a desire to preserve
the personality of the individual worker.

The model was the

autonomous medieval guild, which was seen as a system which per
mitted men to belong to groups and at the same time contribute
to society.

The community was viewed as a spiritual entity,

"a mode of feeling of a number of human beings living together
under the conditions of social life.

Society, on the other hand,

is a group of centres of deliberation and planning".^®

The

state would become simply a group of economic organizations and

18 Ibid., p. 88
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would be devoid of coercive power, which was seen as the root
of all disturbances in society.

Once the state was abolished,

the argument ran, the co-operative principle would reassert
itself and serve as an agent for bringing forth man’s best
qualities, which capitalism had stifled.
The best and most concise precentation of the thought of
the Guild Socialists is G.D.H. Cole's Guild Socialism Re19
stated.

Cole begins by outlining certain assumptions:

democracy ought to prevail in every aspect of life, and de
mocracy attains reality only when it is dealt with vis-a-vis
function.

In large communities representative government is

needed, but representation ceases to be democratic when it
involves the substitution of the will of one for the will of
many.

Parliamentary representation violates the fundamentals

of democracy in two ways: in the first place, the elector has
almost no control over his MP, and when the infrequent oc
casion arises to change him or vote on his conduct the choice
of candidates is severely limited; secondly, only one man re
presents the elector on every conceivable range of topics and
it is highly unlikely that there could be complete agreement
over the whole sphere of human activity.

Essential to demo

cratic representation, the argument runs, are the requirements
that the electors have frequent contact with and a large
measure of control over their representatives, and that re
presentation should be functional.

Human beings cannot be

19 Chicago, 1964.
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represented, only viewpoints.

The two central types of

functional bonds. Cole states, are production and consumption
orientated; in any industry the sets of controls desired by
the two groups would be different.

For example; the coal

miners are primarily concerned with the conditions of work and
the like, while consumers are primarily concerned with quality
and quantity of the product.

Guild Socialism maintains that

internal management and control, as a trust given by the com
munity, should belong to the workers, although safeguards
should be added for the consumer.

This would give workers a

psychological feeling of freedom and self-government. Indirect
control through parliamentary representatives conveys no such
feeling.
Guild Socialism, however, was a passing phenomenon, and
went into an early decline but not without having influenced
trade union and Socialist ideas.

Post-war demands for workers'

control put forward by the trade unions, can in some measure
be attributed to the influence of the Guild Socialists.

The

Sankey Commission on the coal mines, which reported in 1919,
argued for nationalization and, in addition, stated "it is in
the interests of the country that the colliery worker shall in
the future have an effective voice in the direction of the
mines,

20 Quoted in Socialist Thought, IV, pp. 4l7-4l8.
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Socialist Theory in the Inter-War Years
The themes of equality and fellowship were paramount
with Green and the other Oxford idealists and were further
developed in the inter-war years by A.D. Lindsay.

The

philosophical basis of Lindsay's socialism was clearly shown
in his 1928 debate with Laski.

Lindsay's thought is pri

marily philosophical and moral; he goes back to Rousseau's
General Will, disregarding any organic interpretation and
viewing the moral will as general, arguing that man is moti
vated by both selfish and altruistic instincts.

Man wants

to be freed from his selfishness by participation in the com
munity, and, further, pluralism is a device which could be
used as an intermediary to bring the citizen into his full
relationship with the state.

Laski countered by arguing that

the state is only a collection of individuals, and in itself
it is without any moral or ethical importance.

The will of

the state, then, is simply the will of those individuals who
have been able to gain enough power to control it.
purely utilitarian device.

It is a

Lindsay replied, arguing that the

state could undertake the performance of wide ranging reforms
while at the same time preserving its democratic nature only
if it could be proven that the state is no more than the in
strument of select interests.

The state can fulfill its

proper role only once the altruistic instincts of its citizens
are realized.
Lindsay concerned himself with democracy in a manner more
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than faintly reminiscent of John Stuart Mill.

He deprecated

forms and emphasized the necessity of spiritual reality.

To

bring this into being, the social and economic basis of the
state must be changed to bring about equality, as it is im
possible to have real political democracy without social and
economic democracy.

Although leadership is necessary in any

state, there should be continuous participation by the masses
and, in order to attain this, men must be made politically
aware.
It is by living together that men learn what they
want and conceive purposes to which they will de
vote themselves, by playing complementary parts in
a society of which they are all members.21
Once all inequalities in the system are seen to come from
functional distinctions democracy will work.

Socialism in

Lindsay is divorced from material considerations and dialecpp

tical inevitability; it becomes instead a moral necessity.^

The grand theorists of English Socialism owe little to
Marx, and it now becomes necessary to offer some reason for
this.

England was the only European society which by the end

of the nineteenth century had a preponderance of industry
over agriculture and which had correspondingly progressive
political and social institutions.

Although this was the

first country in which revolution should logically have taken

21 A.D. Lindsay, The Modern Democratic State. (London,
1959 ), p. 260.
22 A critique of Lindsay's position is given in Ulam,
pp. 96-120.
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place, Marxism was unable to attract any significant sector
of the population, as its appeal rests on a feeling of
grievance and alienation which was not, relatively speaking,
widespread in the England of the 1890s.

Concern for the

class war could not thrive on a franchise that was as broad
as that which existed in Britain.

Further, the strength of

the trade unions within the existing social structure saw to
it that there was not as great a misunderstanding of the facts
of industrial life as there was in other countries and that
there was some involvement by workers in the politics of the
day, which facilitated concern with piecemeal reform rather
than revolutionary action.

Trade union biases mirrored the

attitude of the workers; the separateness but not the alien
ation that accompanied it in other countries.

They accepted

the industrial system but not capitalism.^3
Marxism had to wait until the 1930s, with the depression
and the rise of Fascism, before it made any significant head
way into the British Socialist movement.

But it then became

a predominant influence in the thought of many socialists, in
large measure intellectuals such as Laski and John Strachey
and persons in the party leadership such as Aneurin Bevan and
Sir Stafford Cripps.

Indeed, even the Webbs and G.D.H. Cole

were strongly influenced by Marx in this period.

2h

23 Adam Ulam, The Unfinished Revolution: An Essay on the
Sources of Influence of Marxism and Communism (New York, I960),
p. 1^3

2k See G.D.H. Cole, What Marx Really Meant (London, 193^)*
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A very few socialist thinkers stood outside the
Marxist stream, and a number of non-analytical
works of a practical reformist nature were still
being written. But Marxism was the dominant in
tellectual influence, and it made a profound im
pact on my generation of socialists in their
formative years ... It is easy to forget today,
not merely how unanimous socialist writers were
in anticipating the collapse of capitalism, but
how completely their analytical systems, their
.prophecies, and their recommendations, all
hinged on this belief.25
Of the major Socialist works produced in this period John
Strachey's writings were most significant in the economic
sphere, while Harold Laski's works were perhaps most signifleant in the political sphere.

26

Laski rejects pluralism, state sovereignty being a neces
sity if the state is to fulfill its function of ensuring a
certain system of class relations.

Laski defines the state

as simply "the executive instrument of the class in society
which owns the means of p r o d u c t i o n . I n order to limit the
power of the state, as the pluralist wants to do, the class
structure of society must first be destroyed.

Every.society

before the advent of a socialist utopia, must sustain some

25 C.A.R. Crosland, The Future of Socialism (London, 196k-),
pp. 2-k.
26 John Strachey, The Coming: Strueele for Power (London,
193k-), and The Nature of Capitalist Crisis (London, 1936),
and for Laski see particularly The State in Theory and Prac
tice (New York, 1935), The Rise of European Liberalism (London,
1936), Democracy in Crisis (Chapel Hill, 1933), and Liberty in
the Modern State (New York, 1930).

27 Quoted in Herbert A. Deane, The Political Ideas of
Harold J. Laski (New York, 195*+), p. 15^«
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system of relationships between classes and the means of
production, and the sovereign state serves as a coercive in
strument to attain that end.

All struggles within the state

are struggles of economic classes trying to obtain the sov
ereign power.

The emergence of Fascism, Laski argues, proves

the validity of the Marxist theory of the state.

The unity

of capitalism and political democracy is a phenomenon of the
expansionist stage of capitalism, but when contraction sets
in the contradictions become apparent, and in order for de
mocracy to survive, capitalism must be replaced by socialism.
But Fascism appears to save the former.

While benefits may

be grudgingly granted to workers in the expansionist stage
of capitalism, these must be severely limited or entirely
curtailed in the contractory phase as they become a threat to
profits.

The masses obey the forces of capitalism because

during its period of expansion it is able to offer them cer
tain benefits; as a result, many become semi-bourgeois.

As

long as capitalism results in a betterment of the worker's
position he will accept its authority but when it can no
longer fulfill,these expectations the danger of revolution
arises.
Laski believed that political power derives from economic
power; and the former, in itself, is totally unable to deal
With the latter.

It is, therefore, a waste of time to at

tempt to limit economic power by legal and political means.
The Socialist state should possess all the power it needs to
reshape society, and this duty must not be hampered by
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limitations on government,

Guild Socialist schemes are,

therefore, of no real value.

In its simplest form this view

point maintains that, if a parliamentary minority refuses to
accept the decision of the parliamentary majority there is
no possibility of a peaceful transformation.

29

If Fascism comes to Britain in the contractory phase
there will be revolutions from below and if this brings a
socialist government, Laski argues, freedom would have to be
sharply curtailed to deal with transitional problems. Even
if its policy met with peaceful acceptance, the
continuance of parliamentary government would de
pend upon its possession of guarantees from the
Conservative Party that its work of transforma
tion would not be disrupted by repeal in the
event of a defeat at the polls.30
Further, if policy were to be opposed by business interests
constitutional government would have to be suspended; and,
although Laski feared physical violence, he maintained that
the blame would not be on the majority but rather the minority.
Liberty may temporarily have to be suppressed in order to at
tain the greater freedom of the age of socialism.

It might

happen that the ruling class would meet a socialist parlia-

28 A table concerning party attitudes towards cultural
norms and symbols in Richard Rose, Politics in England (Boston,
196k), p. 56, shows that while the Conservative and Liberal
parties strongly support limits on government the Labour party
is subject to sharp intra-party divisions ranging from partial
support to complete rejection.

29 Deane, p. I 71.
30. Laski, Democracy in Crisis, p. 87.
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mentary victory by instituting a class dictatorship neces
sitating revolution.

However, Laski cautioned. Socialists

should continue to use constitutional means until the capi
talists tried to smash their

m o v e m e n t . 31

Last among the varied influences on English Socialist
thought are the writings of two prominent Liberals: J.M.
Keynes (later Lord Keynes) and Sir William Beveridge (later
Lord Beveridge),

It was the depression which provided the

chief spur to their thought as it had doubtless done for
Laski.
The idea of freedom as a positive rather than negative
quantity lead to the evolution of a new type of political
economy.

The ills of such a highly developed industrial so

ciety as Britain's were the result, Keynes felt, of a mal
distribution of income and a resulting propensity to oversave,
The economic postulates of this new thought bore a close re
semblance to certain Socialist ideas.

Indeed, there was

nothing opposed to Socialism and much that was congenial to
it in its encouragement of high levels of mass consumption
and its advocacy of a significant redistribution of income by
the use of fiscal

p o l i c y .

32

But such a policy not only

31 Sir Stafford Cripps, later Chancellor of the Exchequer,
took a similar view when he stated: "If the Socialists come to
the conclusion that there was any real danger of such a step
being taken, it would probably be better and more conducive to
the general peace and welfare of the country for the Socialist
government to make itself temporarily into a dictatorship until
the matter could again be put to test at the polls." Quoted in
Ulam, The Philosophical Foundations of English Socialism, p. 73*
32 Ibid., p. 136
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results in increased interference by government in the af
fairs of society but forces the criterion of short-run
economic policy to be one thing: an increase or at least the
maintenance of the current level of the standard of living.
The primary goal becomes security and comfort for the col
lectivity, an undesirable goal to the fundamentalist when it
becomes an end not a means.

The fundamentalist advocates the

abolition of capitalism not primarily because it is an inef
ficient method of production or even because of its effect on
the distribution of goods, but because it is seen as involving
an unjust and immoral system of private property and social
differentiation.

The ethical ideas of equality and fellowship

were inseparably connected with the abolition of capitalism by
means of nationalization.

Some might think it questionable,

therefore, as to how far Keynsian thought is compatible with
the long-run alms of Socialism.

When this type of thought is

coupled with the short-run interests of a Labour government
there is a danger that the long-run aims will be forgotten.
The immediate possibility of curing the worst aspects of the
existing society and changing important priorities in its
operation may well have had preponderant influence over longrun aspirations which have as yet not proven their
effectiveness.33
One of Beveridge's central goals was the attainment of

33 For a critique of reform theory from the Fabians to
Beveridge see Ibid.. pp. 121-161.

177833
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full employment which required that certain powers be in the
hands of government to enable it to modify and adjust the
operation of the market,^

In order to maintain relatively

full employment total outlay had to be subject to some meas
ure of government control and the mobility of the labour
force had to be significantly increased.

Continuing high

taxes, national insurance schemes, a national health service,
a national nutrition policy, and adult education were other
significant recommendations.

There can be little doubt that

the implications of the Beveridge Report are socialist, al
though in its moderate sense.

It provided a general analysis

of economic and social policy under capitalism, and its re
commendations call for severe modifications in the system
which, when backed by certain ethical premises could be call
ed socialist.
The list of essential liberties given above does
not include liberty of a private citizen to own
means of production and to employ other citizens
in operating them at wage. Whether private owner
ship of means of production to be operated by
others is a good economic device or not, it must
be judged as a device. It is not an essential
liberty in Britain, because it is not and never
has been enjoyed by more than a very small pro
portion of the British people.35
The thought of the major party factions in the 1950s was
heavily coloured by the political theory of the pre-war English
socialists.

And although, strong Guild Socialist and Neo-

3k- The main proposals were embodied in The Report on
Social Insurance and Allied Services (New York, 19*+2).
35 Sir William Beveridge, Full Employment in a Free So
ciety (New York, 19k-5)j p. 23.
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Idealist elements can be found on the left and strong Fabian
elements on the right, the two most immediate and primary
influences were the Marxism of thinkers like Laski and
Strachey on the one hand, and the Welfare State ideology of
Beveridge and Keynes on the other.
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CHAPTER II

THE LABOUR PARTY: FUNDAMENTALISM AND REVISIONISM
Labour in the post-war government carried out many of
the Beveridge proposals, but it was not long before sharp
divisions arose regarding the party's purpose and policies,
and Bevan's resignation as Minister of Health served simply
to dramatize this deep conflict over the fundamental aims of
the party.

The party, of course, had always been pluralis

tic and had long had various tendencies but the debate in
previous years had taken place within a certain ideological
consensus.

The critical period in the transformation of the

party ran from 19k-? to 1950,

Post-war plans were made and

reconstruction begun with faith in the old Socialism, but
the experience of office caused a swing in party attitudes.
The most significant and vital change in policy was the
trend away from the idea of the Socialist Commonwealth and
the acceptance of the Welfare State and planned economy as
the basis for government action,

Attlee's government was

forced to make a decision between the continued use of the
market as a basis for economic policy and its abolition.

In

its decision, the government was heavily influenced by Keynes
and Beveridge and by the system of quantitative planning
using physical controls which had been a central method of
resource allocation during the war,

28
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The Post-War Transformation
In the initial post-war years the Labour government con
tinued to emphasize physical planning and give financial
policy a second place.

However, it should be noted, the use

of physical planning was not totally the result of socialist
ideology but would have, in any event, played a significant
role whatever party had held power.

In dealing with post

war inflationary pressure the government tried to hold prices
down by using direct controls.

But the 19*+7-1950 period saw

sharp changes with the greatly increased use of financial
policy in the form of deflationary analysis accompanied by a
corresponding decrease in the use of physical controls,
particularly in the area of labour mobility.

The significant

factor here was the realization that it was not a labour
shortage that was the cause of Britian's economic ills but
rather suppressed inflation and that this prevented the flow
of labour to.certain industries.

This labour immobility led

to a seeming misallocation of resources.

What was needed,

according to Keynsian analysis, was a surplus budget and
greater use of the market.

Pressure had been for some time

put on the government by various economists, economic jour
nalists, and MPs but the government did not retreat full
force from physical planning concepts.

In fact, in 19*+7 it

enlarged the planning sphere because certain factions in the
party, particularly the Keep Left group of MPs (most notably
R.H.S, Crossman, Michael Foot, and Ian Mikardo), which ad
vocated nationalization of every industry which had any degree
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of control over the economy as well as the extensive use of
physical planning, were strongly critical of deflationary
p o l i c y ,

36

By 1950, however, the physical planning principle

had been abandoned, and Cripps in his budget of that year
called for the full use of financial policy citing it as the
most important means of government control over the economy.
This approach could not help but bring into doubt the value
of large scale nationalization and even the traditional
socialist conception of fellowship, for such policies re
quired the maintenance of a modified form of capitalism and,
indeed, had to rely, in large part, for their effectiveness
on self-interest and the profit motive.
Quite aside from any value financial controls might have
over physical planning in a pure economic sense, the abandon
ment of controls was particularly influenced by the unfavor
able attitude of the trade unions towards a high degree of
government direction over the organization and movement of
labour.

As the problem of inflation became more acute critics

began to call for some type of wage policy, but as such a
policy would have interfered with collective bargaining the
unions opposed it.

In the early months of 1948 a compromise

solution was reached.

As a result, the policy of wage re

restraint was to remain effective for three years; union

36 See particularly Thomas Balogh, "Britain's Economic
Problems," Quarterly Journal of Economics. LXIII, no, 1
(Feb., 1949 ), 32-67 .
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agreement, however, being tentative upon the government’s
ability to keep prices and profits down at the same time. The
pound was devalued in 19*+9 resulting in price increases in

1950 and, as a result, the General Council of the Trade Union
Congress (TUC) passed a resolution opposing wage restraint.
The government tried to reach some agreement with the unions
but to no avail.
This served to show exactly what the unions would and
would not do; they refused to accept government control over
manpower and showed their determination to maintain their
traditional functional role and position.

In effect, they

refused to accept the Socialist Commonwealth.

A greater num

ber of changes had occurred since the inter-war years.

The

material welfare of the workers had improved immensely, es
pecially in relation to other classes, and the power of the
unions had undergone a drastic increase through Labour's
membership in the coalition government and its increased con
tacts with ministers and civil

s e r v a n t s . 37

The unions were

no longer primarily dependent on a particular party being in
power, and this increased the feeling of participation in
major policy decisions and led to a greater sense of accept
ance, a more pragmatic attitude, and, a greater willingness

37 C.A.R, Crosland, "The Future of the Left," Encounter.
XIV, no. 3 (March, I 96O), 3-12.
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38
to compromise,J
The experience and responsibility of office alone would
have caused a realignment of policy.
culties, coupled with the balance

Inflationary diffi

of payments

sitated a reorientation in Socialist

thought,

crisis

neces

and thisled

to the necessary conclusion that it was production, not dis
tribution, that was the central problem in the economic sys
tem.

Nationalization had hitherto been the most important

single item in party policy.
As, a program it was justified in diverse and often
contradictory ways but while
it remained
merely
program, it served admirably
to unite different
interests within the p a r t y , 39

a

The policy of nationalization was put in the hands of a group
of ministers led by Herbert Morrison who saw it as being pri
marily a means of increasing economic efficiency.

Other

groups within the party objected sharply when they saw that
nationalized industries, run on the lines of strict pursuit of
commercial practice, were difficult to hold accountable to
Parliament and failed to allow for workers' participation.
The 1951 election defeat prompted, on the part of numer
ous Labourites, an analysis of the causes of the disaster.

38 The bulk of this analysis is based on S,H, Beer, pp.
188-216, For a more detailed analysis of financial and eco
nomic policy see his Treasury Control: The Co-ordination of
Financial and Economic Policy in Great Britain (Oxford, 1957).
39 Gerhard Loewenberg, "The Transformation of the British
Labour Party Since 1945," Journal of Politics. XXI, no, 3
(May, 1959 ), 244.
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A major reason for the defeat was seen to be the inability
of Labour candidates to pick up a significant number of
Liberal votes where for the first time there was no Liberal
candidate.

1+0

Several studies showed that the party's sup

port was heterogeneous and not divided on strict class
lines.The

party, or rather certain sections of it, were

increasingly tempted to aim their appeal at the marginal
voter in the centre of the political spectrum, rather than at
their most ardent supporters who were, they felt, sure to
support it in any case because of the lack of any realistic
alternative.

The revisionists then, accepted what they saw

as. the need for change and were ready to change doctrine to
accommodate it, but a significant segment of the party op
posed this.
The revisionist view that the Labour party must grope
for the middle ground in order to obtain the margin of vic
tory seems to have been empirically validated.

Further, elec

tions are decided by the overall change in voting behavior and
from 1945 to 1959 the total movement towards the Conservatives
was 7.3 percent while between 1950 and 1959 it was only 4 per
cent.

Thus a relatively small change in attitude during the

latter period could have wiped out the Conservative majority

40 H.G, Nicholas, The British General Election of 1950
(London, I95I), pp. 296, 320-21.
41 Most notably see Mark Penney, A.P. Gray, and R.H.
Pear, How People Vote (London, 1956), pp. 175-189.
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and brought back a Labour government.
page explains this.

Table 1 on the next

From the evidence provided it seems fair

to deduce that about 85 percent of the voters were or ap
peared to be absolutely stable in their attitudes.
certain qualifications must be added.

However,

Not all those who vote

at any one election vote at the next; there is an influx of
new voters and a decrease in the number of old voters, as
about one half million die each year.

In this way one sixth

of the electorate is replaced every ten years.

Further, if

abstainers can be induced to support a given party this can
provide the margin of victory.

If a third party candidate

enters the race this can effect the margin of votes decisive
ly.

Lastly, the swing vote is only overall; there is always

a minority that vote against the trend.

Thus, it is esti

mated that about one quarter of the electorate can, in fact,
be classified as floating.
The revisionist theory of long-term shifts in the elec
torate's attitudes is particularly significant, although it
must be seen as part of a general tendency and caution must
be exercised so that the argument is not overstated. General
ly, affluence detracts from Labour support to the benefit of
the Conservatives, and although this is the pattern as it de
veloped in the 1950s it could be reversed in the future.
Despite this, since the opinion of Labour and Conservative

k-2 Jean Blondel, Voters. Parties and Leaders ; The Social
Fabric of British Politics (Harmondsworth, 1963), P . 69.
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Table- I
Voting in Post-War General Elections: 19^5-59

Year

Electors Voters

Conservatives

Labour

Liberal

Other

675

(thousands)
1 9 4 5

32,836

24,083

9 , 5 7 8

11,633

2,1 9 7

1 9 5 0

3 4 , 2 7 0

2 8 , 7 7 3

1 2 , 5 0 3

1 3 , 2 6 7

2 , 6 2 2

381

28,596

1 3 , 7 1 8

1 3 , 9 ^ 9

1 98

2 6 , 7 6 0

1 3 , 2 8 7

731
722

27,859

1 3 , 7 5 0

195 1
1 9 5 5
1 9 5 9

34,646
34,858
35,297

1 2 ,4 0 5
12,216

1 ,6 3 9

346
2 5 5

Source; Jean Blondel, Voters. Parties and Leaders : The Social
Fabric of British Politics (Harmondsworth, 1963), p. 69
electors were not radically different, it was an exception to
see a voter support his party consistently on all issues.
Gallup polls indicate "that the majority and the minority on
each issue cut across party lines as much as they follow
t h e m .

"^3

Thus, while Labour electors were more leftist than

Conservative, both groups were very close to the national
average.

Partisanship was usually about 30 percent with a

maximum of 45 percent and there was therefore always a sub
stantial minority of Labour (or Conservative) electors sup
porting the opposite view.

Figure I on the following page

indicates the degree of cohesion of the attitudes of electors

4 3 . Ibid..

p.

75
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Figure I
Proportion of Electors of the Two Main Parties Favoring a
Rightwing Answer on Individual Issues
Humanit- Foreign affairs
arian

Right

Economic and .social
issues
A

Conservât!

20^

Left

1 2 3 ^ 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1^ 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22

Source: Jean Blondel, Voters. Parties and Leaders : The Social
Fabric of British Politics (Harmondsworth, 196'), p. 78.
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towards policy issues.
The electoral supporters of both parties seldom agree
with all major policy lines, but select issues in themselves
do not seem to form the basis of party loyalty.

Electors

tend to choose not between programmes but rather between im
ages such as the Welfare State and free enterprise.

Images

are generally influenced by issues over time, by party lead
ership and by party dynamism.

It was the pre-war image of

Labour that the post-war revisionists sought to change. While
in 19*+9 twenty-seven percent of the public favored further

^+4 The numbers running along the horizontal line repre
sent specific policy issues as follows:
1 Humanitarianism: capital punishment
2
:corporal punishment
3 Liberal
;reform of licensing laws
h
;reform of the House of Lords to enable peers
to stand for the Commons
5 Foreign Affairs: nuclear disarmament
6
testing of nuclear weapons by the West
setting of nuclear bases in Britain
7
8
recognition of East Germany
opinion of Spain
9
10
opinion on South Africa
11
opinion on the U.N.
12
entry into the Common Market
13 Economic and
Social Issues
taxes: satisfaction with the level of taxation
Ik
: choice between taxes and social services
: raising the level or surtax
15
16
: abolition of Schedule A tax
: introduction of a capital gains tax
increase in National Health Service charges
further nationalization measures
19
20
industrial relations : resist wage claims
21
: sympathy with workers
on strike
22
: responsibility for costof-living increase with
government or trade
unions
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nationalization, by I960 this had declined to eleven percent.

1+5

Such statistics clearly bothered segments of the party who
were determined to modernize it and make it more responsive
to the electorate, upon whom its ultimate survival depended.
Such a change, they felt, would be comparable to changes made
by the Conservative party, which had at first opposed many
Labour policies and then moved further towards the centre by
accepting them.

This flexibility in attitude, in the Con

servative party, which results from the party's overriding
concern with gaining office, was one of the primary reasons
the Conservatives formed the government during the entire
1951-1959 period,

Crosland's comment sums up the revisionist

position: "If British Socialism succeeds in adapting itself
and its doctrines to the mid-twentieth century, it might even
get back into power, and have a chance to implement them."

1+6

Two factors then, the change in economic planning and the
change in the electorate's attitudes, were the chief influences
on the development of the revisionist and fundamentalist fac
tions that were the protagonists in the struggle of the 1950s.

Revisionism
The argument of the revisionists during the 1950s was that
the ethical aspects of Socialism were of the essence.

It was

45 S.H. Beer, British Politics in the Collectivist Age
(New York, 1965 ) , p. 21 ? .
46 C.A.R. Crosland, p. 12,
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held that the significant factors were equality of opportu
nity and, trailing at a respectful distance, fellowship, and
that while these ends were all important the means of attain
ment were constantly in flux and the party had to adopt it
self to the age it was living in.

Thus, complete support of

certain ethical ends was to be combined with an extremely
flexible concept of means.

The revisionists wrote that early

socialism with its desire to do away with capitalism had con
tinually lost support as the basic economy theory on which
the principles stood had been undermined.

What was left,

they felt, was simply a remnant from the past.

47
‘

The dif

ficulty was that the early Socialist belief in the social
ethic was inseparably connected with a certain view of the
operation of the social and economic forces in society. Indeed,
it is questionable if the social ethic and the theory of social
forces can be separated.

Revisionist theory left an important

private sphere in which self-interest was the motivating force
and while, under such a system equality and a limited amount
of fellowship might be attained, it is highly questionable
whether a complete transition to the Socialist Commonwealth
can ever be made.

It could be argued that the social ethic had

itself been changed, that man could never be a purely selfless
being and that therefore, one must adjust one's views to the
essential nature of man.

In essence, this was the most signi-

47 Socialist Union, Twentieth Century Socialism (Harmonds
worth, 1956), p. 12.
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ficant and underlying change that revisionism necessitated,
C.A.R. Crosland’s The Future of Socialism is a pithy and
succinct statement of revisionism as outlined by its leading
t h e o r i s t . C r o s l a n d maintains that the most characteristic
and offensive aspects of nineteenth century capitalism have
either been completely eliminated or have become so modified
as to be almost unrecognizable and that, as a result, a
nineteenth-century analysis of the system has little rele
vance for the 1950s.

Further, certain aspects of the system,

such as the separation of the workers from the means of pro
duction which had previously been connected with and ascribed
to private ownership had been found to stem from the intri
cacies of large scale organization.

Crosland enlarged on

this maintaining that conditions were slowly changing and
increasingly separating ownership and control, and arguing
that it was function that determined class,not ownership.
The variety of sources of Socialist doctrine, Crosland
maintains, make it impossible to find a central orthodox view
to serve as

a guide to future action.

The differences be

tween Socialist theories are numerous and with many of them
it is not a case of priorities; they are just mutually incom
patible.

With this, the argument runs, all that can be done

is to make an attempt to Isolate certain themes that have had
a predominant influence, which have occurred in several of
varied schools, and which are of relevance to contemporary

48 (London, 1964).
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society.

Further, a sharp distinction has to be made between

ends and means.

Ethical goals then become the only signifi

cant link between all Socialsts.

These are: a desire to al

leviate the conditions of the workers under capitalism,
social welfare, equality, fellowship and opposition to cer-

49
tain defects in the system, most significantly unemployment.
The first and last of these, Crosland maintains, are becoming
unimportant as capitalism is transformed, and this leaves
fellowship, equality, and social welfare as the chief ethical
goals of society.
It proves difficult to create, Crosland argues, any
permanent feelings of fellowship in a full sense.

The goal

of co-operation has, of course, been partially reached as
any comparison with the situation of a century ago well il
lustrates.

The competitive instinct has suffered severe blows

yet full co-operation has by no means been achieved.

Although

self-interest remains a vital factor in individual decision
making and its importance might be further diminished, there
is no means of telling if this would be the case and no prac
tical plan exists which might be followed in order to make it
so, without the strong risk of serious detrimental effects
being felt in the search for the attainment of other desir
able ends such as the standard of living, privacy, and equal-

49 Crosland mentions that he has included only economic
and social values and has deleted political ones as concern
for the latter permeates the whole of the political culture.
Ibid.. p. 68.
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ity,

Crosland continues:
While, therefore, I realize that as a matter of
verbal precision the co-operative ideal is cer
tainly embraced by the word 'socialism', and
while I accept that it would clearly be in some
sense 'better' if there were a more general
awareness of a common social purpose.
I do not
feel able, in what is intended to be a reason
ably definite and practical statement of social
ist aims, to include this as part of the goal.50

Thus, the central theme of inter-war Socialism is relegated
to the background.
Social welfare and equality remain, but neither of them
is primarily economic in nature; although the greatest abuses
have formerly been in the economic sphere.
been largely remedied.

But these have

With the present rate of growth,

Crosland states, the economic sphere will require even less
attention and socialism will be able to turn to the social
and psychological causes of distress.

Economic factors are

no longer considered the sole determinants of class; educa
tion, style of life and occupational status have now become
matters of primary concern.

In the pre-1939 period there was

a definite need for the levelling of income; but in the 1950s
any further redistribution would have been ineffective in the
sense of having a significant bearing on the standard of
living of the masses.

The bitterness present in Britain is

sociological not economic in origin; in a period where all
are relatively well off social discrimination is rampant.
Industrial disputes then become not so much matters of wages

50 Ibid.. p. 76.
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and conditions of work but of prestige and power.
There is a strong ethical basis in the quest for greater
equality in that it would lead to the realization of a greater
degree of social justice, decrease resentment, and increase
contentment.

The existing inequalities which offend against

social justice are the educational system, the small segment
of citizens in the upper stratum of society who monopolize in
herited wealth, the power of the bureaucrat in industry, nepo
tism, and.class favoritism.

Crosland argues that means should

be taken to limit the power of elites and to establish a more
cohesive and harmonious society through the elimination of
class differences with their great reinforcing effect on so
cial stratification.

Crosland concludes;

... as we approach the socialist goals described
above, the reformer will bend his energies more
and more to issues which cannot be classified as
specifically socialist or non-socialist, but which
lie in other fields altogether ... the freedom of
personal and leisure life and social responsibili
ty for cultural values.51

Fundamentalism
A significant group of Socialists were not willing to
accept this change which meant the de facto abandonment of
nationalization and the relegation of fellowship to a sub
sidiary place vis-a-vis equality.

There was considerable sup

port for the editors of the semi-official organ of the Left,

51 Ibid., p. 353
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Tribune, when in its July 11, 1952 issue it rejected inno
vations in theory because it
consists not in producing new ideas or fresh ap
proaches, but in watering down distinctive
socialist ideas ,.. The dynamic socialism of in
dustrial society made fifty or one hundred years
ago ... is infinitely more modern and more rele
vant to the problems of our d a y . 52
The Left's attitude toward the Keynsian revolution was best
summed up by R.H.S. Crossman; "Keynsianism may have undermined
the old fashioned economic case for Socialism but it has left
the political and moral case for it completely unaffected.
This does not mean the fundamentalists were united on all
things; although their position as a minority group in the
party tended to increase cohesion.

Even though fundamental

ist policies were, to a large extent, similar in the inter-war
years diversity in detail was great.

But there tended to be

basis agreement on two of the most significant aspects of
Socialism; nationalization and fellowship.
Defining the Labour Left is difficult, if not impossible,
as relatively few of those who styled themselves as leftists
were thoroughgoing Marxists.

But many had definite Marxist

leanings mixed with a type of socialist humanism.

Aside from

the few hard core Marxists those who styled themselves

as

leftists tended to rely increasingly on the writings of

a few

prominent American intellectuals, most notably C. Wright Mills

52 Quoted in Gerhard Loewenberg, p. 238.
53 R.H.S. Crossman, Socialism and the New Despotism
(London, 1956), p. 5.
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and J.K. Galbraith.

Even within the PLP it would have been

almost an impossibility to find a definitely structured and
coherent system except among the hard core of some fifty
members who were consistently on the Left,

A substantial

number of core leftists were and are journalists, intellec
tuals, and teachers.

The journalists tended to be seen as

the leading element both within and without the PLP and the
list of such members is long.^^

The Left gained a substan

tial margin of its strength from its influence through the
mass media; this provided a continuous flow of information
to the faithful and a strong element of continuity.
The Marxist flavor of the Left was very noticeable.

'

The Left uses a number of stereotypes or concepts
of Marxist provenance; a stereotype of capitalism,
the concept of 'economic power', the conception of
class as an economic category; and with these goes
the notion of class-war and the belief that funda
mentally all social relationships are determined
by economic forces. In some instances, these no
tions are articulated together and held quite
cosciously in a kind of Marxist system. In most
cases, however, they are floating notions, hardly
held together by any systematic philosophy vestiges and residues of Marxism, often held un
consciously as presuppositions or assumptions.

From this vantage point came a distrust and suspicion of
American motives and actions and a sympathy for the Soviet
Union.

The distrust of America stemmed from its being the

5“+ Eugene J. Meehan, The British Left Wing and Foreign
Policy (New Brunswick, New Jersey, I 96O), pp. 27-31.
55 S.E. Finer, H.B. Berrington and D.J. Bartholomew,
Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons : 1955-1959 (London,
1961), p. 52. For a particularly good example see R.H.S.
Grossman, "The Spectre of Revisionism," Encounter, XIV, no. h
(April, I960), 24-28.
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last stronghold of 'pure' capitalism, its materialism, and
its hegemony over the British economy and over Britain as a
political entity in the world power struggle.
the Soviet Union was sympathetic.

Feeling toward

Many were initially con

fident that Britain was well suited to establish good rela
tions with Russia and while this attitude fell by the wayside
in the centre and on the right in the early post-war years it
continued to be cardinal to the left.

Laski went to great

lengths to argue that Russia's main aim was security, and
that once this had been attained brutality and policies like
those in Eastern Europe would quickly d i s a p p e a r . T h e r e is
certainly a grain of truth in this; but more moderate was
Sevan's attitude.
The dominating position of the U.S. would have been
much easier to accept if there had been a clear
idea of what she wanted to do with it. Of that
there was no clue, except, of course, that she was
against communism.
It was also obvious from many
of the speeches of her principle spokesmen that she
was almost as strongly opposed to British Socialism.
In addition, the Left tended to be pacifistic.

But this has

had a long tradition in British politics, particularly during
the inter-war years and significantly, most strongly in the
Labour party.

■It should be kept in mind that although the

Left placed much emphasis on foreign policy that Socialist
views in that area tend to be applications of theories already
developed in the domestic sphere.

56 See Herbert A. Deane, The Political Ideas of Harold
J. Laski (New York, 1954), pp. 320-324 for a discussion of
Laski's views on the Soviet Union.
57 Aneuran Bevan, In Place of Fear (London, 1952), pp.
125-126 .
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Anti-colonialism and views toward foreign aid were
particularly significant in this light.

The Left maintained

that armaments alone were not enough to keep the peace.

In

stead of peace being primarily dependent on arms, it was
felt that poverty was one of the primary causes of interna
tional tensions.

The preservation of peace, then, was seen

as being a political, economic, and social matter.

Foreign

aid, as well as being a necessity if world peace were to be
maintained, was seen as being a direct application of the
socialist goal of fellowship.

The Left argued, in a parti

cularly strong manner, that the money being spent on British
armaments should have been spent on the much more immediate
and stronger need of aid to underdeveloped countries.
Socialism and the New Despotism, by R.H.S. Crossman,
presents a theory of social organization which is a represen
tative statement of views concerning domestic affairs that
found wide acceptance on the left.

Crossman argues that

Labour has been losing support because of its association with
war-time and post-war controls, bureaucratic control of so
cialized industry, the feeling that the Socialist revolution
was not in fact increasing freedom but rather moving towards
a managerial society, and the equation, in some circles, of
British and Soviet Socialism.
Before 1945 the major problem was seen as mass unemploy
ment but the Keynsian revolution gave an effective solution
to this.

Keynes stated. Crossman goes on, that his solution

would resolve the contradiction- of capitalism; in line
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with this it can be seen that the least dogmatic parts of the

1945-50 Labour government's programme were the most success
ful.

The Welfare State was an unmitigated success but nation

alization did not go all the way expected in improving the
conditions of the workers in the industries concerned.
Britain, Grossman feels, is getting the worst of both worlds
(East and West) because oligopoly not monopoly or perfect
competition prevails.

58

This oligopoly, he maintains, is

protected by a monolithic bureaucracy which stifles compe
tition and, as a result, does not create the desired equili
brium which is present in the United States.

Thus, while it

might seem that there are only two choices open, it would be
incorrect to base Socialism, which is essentially a moral pro
test against injustice, on any specific economic theory.

So

cial and political aspects attain, therefore, great importance
in economic organization.
Tawney proved, Grossman maintains, that political demo
cracy and political freedom are attainable only when they are
combined with social control of the economy; public control
may be no easier to work with but without it freedom is impos
sible.^9

Tawney's analysis became steadily more relevant

58 It is difficult to understand how Grossman can see the
situation in the U.S. as approximating perfect competition or
even as being significantly less oligopolistic than Britain.
59 See particularly R.H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society
(New York, 1920).
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because of the increasing oligarchical and oligopolistic
trends in industry.

However, it is not private companies

alone which threaten freedom; Imperial Chemicals and the
Coal Board are very similar in their effect.

The latter is

just as concerned with its balance sheet as I.C.I. and thus,
it cannot pursue a price policy based on the national in
terest.

It is not fully accountable to Parliament, and the

degree of worker's participation is no more than that in
progressive private companies.

It may, in fact, be more

difficult for technicians and the like to work for the Coal
Board.

Nationalization, as it has been carried out, has

benefits in the government's control of capital investment
and broad policy and in the increased stability which re
sults from a decrease in unearned incomes and capital gains,
but it was very far from Tawney's goal.

Further, the growth

of the state bureaucracy is another threat to democracy.
Those possessing power through economic concentration should
be made fully accountable.

Crossman adds;

Our Socialism is based on the traditional Radical
demand for a society of free and equal citizens,
reinforced by the empirical postulate that great
concentrations of power become a menace to free
dom and equality unless they are subjected to
public control.80
Crossman maintains that the democratic socialist must carry
the trade unionists along with him even if this slows forward
progress.

The trade unions, being a product of as well as a

60 Crossman, p. 7*
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reaction against capitalism, inherited some of the letter's
characteristics.

Thus, while the primary aim of a socialist

might be the extension of public ownership, the necessary
primary aim of the trade union leader is to improve wages
and conditions of work from within a given economic system,
even if this means giving the system added support.

There

is always a danger that the party will lose its Socialism
and become merely an agent of trade union interests.

So

cialists should not expect the initiative in modern Socialism
to come from either the trade unions or co-operatives. Cross
man adds.

Instead, it must come from the Labour party and it

must be based not on economic ideas alone but also on poli
tical ones such as freedom and responsibility.

Since oli

garchy is inevitable, one must either permit the oligopolies
to operate as they do, or subject them to public control; and
to ensure public control public ownership is necessary.
Since the general populace is not convinced of the merit
of large scale nationalization the best method to proceed
with. Crossman feels, is government takeover of those sectors
of the economy where the beneficial results of public owner
ship would be most obvious.

But, in addition, every nation

alized industry should be responsible to Parliament.

Cross

man's second aim is to make industries subject to some
measure of worker's control.

The only way trade unions in

Britain would favor the continued nationalization of industry
is if they see it in an increase in their own status.
Civil servants, who, in fact, control government depart-
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merits should be divested of such power.

Such control should

be returned to the elected representatives of the people by
allowing Ministers to gain complete control of their depart
ments by bringing with them a 'brain trust' of three or four
advisors as a sort of departmental cabinet.

In addition,

ministers must be made more responsible to Parliament, and
the electorate.

Ministerial responsibility to Parliament,

Crossman argues, is largely a matter of fiction; further,
the position of the individual MP has been hampered as he is
no longer primarily responsible to the electorate but to the
party.

There is a need for the democratization of Parliament.

Such things as standing committes responsible for each
nationalized industry could increase democracy and the status
of the backbencher.
The post-war economic and social situation led to the
development of two factions within the Labour party which
served as the central forces in the ideological struggle of
the 1950s.

The positions of the two groups began to be seen,

by their members, as being irreconcilable and this led to the
creation of a situation where compromise was regarded as trea
son.

This split severely damaged the party as a whole, parti

cularly its standing in the country.

It was only once a

general compromise was arrived at and relative unity restored
that Labour was able to gain office.
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CHAPTER III

THE LABOUR PARTY AND POLICY FORMATION
Normally, one of the primary aims of party leadership
in the two party system is to increase support among the
electorate to the extent that this will result in its ob
taining the margin of v i c t o r y . T h i s is one of the central
concerns of most party members, but it is more important to
the party leader as his role makes him particularly sensi
tive to the views of the electorate, as he has the distinct
possibility of becoming Prime Minister.

The knowledge that

stress and cleavage within the party hinder electoral pros
pects and seriously undermine party strength by adversely
affecting the party image among the general populace lead
him to attempt to increase this strength by increasing co
hesion and decreasing cleavage and, as a result, stress.
But, at the same time, in Labour's case, too sharp a swing to
the left would tend to alienate a significant number of vo
ters in the centre of the political spectrum who provide the
party with the necessary margin of victory.

As a result,

there is usually a tendency to balance concessions to the

61 The term leadership needs some clarification. While
in its broad sense it includes all centres where a signifi
cant power locus exists in certain contexts it refers to the
majority leadership in the party which during the period under
Similar
study was substantially moderate and/or revisionist.
ity the party leader was throughout the period moderate and/or
revisionist and references to the role of leader presume that
such was the case.
52
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left and concessions to the centre to obtain maximum returns
in the sense of increased electoral strength.

This would

entail moving to the left on some issues where it was felt
there would only be marginal losses of support in the centre
and to the right on those issues where it was felt there
would be only a marginal decrease in party strength through
increased cleavage.

The Labour Party: 1951-1959
The 1945 election manifesto of the Labour Party serves
as a starting point for the following analysis, as it illus
trates both the extent and the limits of Left-Wing influence
on the formation of party policy.

At the December, 1944

Labour party conference, Ian Mikardo moved an amendment to
commit the party in its election manifesto to the national
ization of "land, large-scale building, heavy industry, and
all forms of banking, transport, and fuel and p o w e r . T h e
National Executive Committee (NEC) asked him not to press
the matter to a vote.

He did, and it was carried by such a

majority that a card vote was not thought necessary.

The

Conference vote did, in fact, have its effect on the mani
festo.

Although there was little sympathy on the NEC for

the nationalization of banks and the building industry, the
manifesto promised that the banks would be 'harmonized' in
their operation with the industrial sector and that 'drastic

62 Labour Party, Report of the Annual Conference (Lon
don, 1944), p. 160.
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action' would be taken to ensure the efficiency of the build
ing industry.

It is likely that the inclusion of iron and

steel nationalization was decisively brought about by the
Conference resolution, as the previous chances for its in
clusion had neither been particularly bad nor good.

The NEC

subcommittee set up to prepare for the election had made no
move to include iron and steel, but Hugh Dalton threatened
to bring the whole matter up at Conference, "and then
Morrison and Greenwood could explain to the delegates why
this item, which had been enthusiastically adopted by the
Conference only last December, had now v a n i s h e d . M o r r i s o n
acquiesced.

It must, however, be remembered that Conference

had this degree of influence only because there was support
for such a move on the NEC.

Mikardo himself seemed pleased

enough with the result of his resolution:
Of course, I wasn't ... much disturbed by the
fact that some points covered by my resolution
were not included in Let Us Face the Future.
When one defeats the NEC one is quite happy
with a ninety percent v i c t o r y . 64
Of the 1945-46 session, though, Dalton said: "Yes, we were
all in step then."85

63 Hugh Dalton, The Fateful Years (London, 1957), pp.

432-433 .
64 Quoted In S.H. Beer, British Politics in the Collect
ivist Age (New York, 1965), p. 178.

65 Hugh Dalton, High Tide and After (London, I 962), p.
47
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The Left first began to gain real prominence in the
public eye over foreign affairs with its opposition to
Ernest Bevin's foreign policy.

The main element in the

group were the 'Keep Left' MBs, who began holding regular
meetings in 1946.

They were led by R.H.S. Crossman, Michael

Foot, and Ian Mikardo who were chiefly responsible for the
pamphlet Keen Left, which was published in May 194? and
which provided a statement of principles.

The pamphlet's

central argument was that the government's policy was not a
socialist foreign policy but rather, one of continuity.
Following the 194/ Conference, in which Bevin obtained over
whelming support for his policy, the 'Keep Left' revolt
virtually came to an end.

With its demise, the party again

seemed to regain some of its cohesiveness, probably because
of its absorption in the implementation of policy that had
already been developed and the fear of damaging the party's
chances of again forming the government after the next elec
tion.

This is not to say that there were not differences,

but simply that they were largely hidden from the general
public.
The 1950's saw the outbreak of severe internal strife,
much of which took place in public and greatly weakened the
position of the party in the country.

In April 1951, both

Bevan and Harold Wilson resigned from the cabinet, allegedly
over the putting of a charge on dentures and spectacles. The
real causes, however, went far deeper.

In the first place.
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Bevan had been passed over at the Exchequer and the Foreign
Office.

Secondly, there was Morrison's determination to push

the party to the right, for which he received strong support
from Sir Arthur Deakin, Sir William Lawther, and Sir Thomas
Williamson, the leading trade union leaders.

Their attitudes

towards the Left were at least, if not more, vociferous than
those of the Left towards them.

Bevan's position was clear

ly stated: "I am not interested in the election of another
Labour Government.

I am interested in the election of a

Government that will make Britain a socialist

c o u n t r y .

"86

Morrison, however, was in a better position to influence
policy because of his position as Chairman of the policy sub
committee of the NEC and because of significant union sup
port at Conference.

He did not want a specific list of in

dustries to be nationalized, rather, he wanted certain
criteria laid down which could be used as a guide in future
takeovers.
successful.

Nevertheless, Bevan's pressure was partially
The 1950 election programme included proposals

to take over sugar, cement and water, to nationalize cold
storage, and to look into the possibility of taking over the
chemical industry and agricultural land which was being in
efficiently farmed, as well as to establish public firms
to compete with private ones in sectors of the economy which

66 Quoted in Leslie Hunter, The Road to Brighton Pier
(London, 1957), p. 22,
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were

l a g g i n g ,

^7

However, Morrison, after the election, gained

support and, further, the Labour majority was too small to push
through any controversial legislation.
.The split, an ideological one, was compounded by Sevan's
struggle for power in the party.

The Bevanite revolt con

tinued for six years until the 1957 reconciliation with Gaitskell, when Bevan became shadow Foreign Secretary.

Yet, this

eliminated only one of the sources of conflict; the ideologi
cal cleavage remained.

The party was still split, with from

one quarter to one fifth of the PLP considering themselves on
the left and continuing to retain an array of capable and
intelligent spokesmen.

The Bevanite struggle, although serv

ing to illuminate the factions in the party, must be viewed
in perspective as simply one phase of the continuing struggle
for influence in the party.

In fact, it could be argued that

the Left's influence was less than it otherwise would have
been during this period, especially after the election of
Gaitskell to the party leadership.

Bevan and Gaitskell's

intransigence lessened the probability of arriving at work- .
able compromises.

It facilitated emotional, involvement but

not understanding,

Gaitskell's attempt to combine the lead

ership of the party with the leadership of a faction and
Bevan's attempt to combine the leadership of a faction with
the role of heir apparent resulted in an intransigence where
compromise was equated with betrayal.

The influence of

67 Ibid.. p. 23
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Deakin, Lawther, and Williamson pressed Gaitskell further to
the right; these men were far less willing to compromise than
most groups in the party and the very intensity of the strug
gle over Clause IV illustrates this.^®

It might be asked how

important the rephrasing of the clause to show that national
ization was only one of a number of means leading to the
attainment of Socialism really was.

It might be argued that

its emotional value to certain elements on the left was suf
ficient to let it stand, and that the certain damage the
party would suffer as the result of a long and protracted
struggle would be reason enough to let the matter lie.
Gaitskell, obviously, rejected this line of reasoning and
again involved himself in another divisive struggle in which
he was defeated.
There could be no greater contrast than that of Gaitskell
and Attlee.

The latter managed to hold his party together as

a relatively cohesive whole for some time.

The 'Keep Left'

group had advocated the establishment of a Ministry of Economic
Affairs, while a letter to the New Statesman by Percy Daine,
MP, which was published anonymously, started an 'Attlee must
go' movement.

Cripps tried to assume the leadership of this

group, but Attlee avoided letting things get too far out of
hand and decided to create a Ministry of Economic Affairs to
offer to Cripps.

"Not for the first time Attlee had shown

his ability to bend just enough with the wind to avoid being

68 See Chapter I, p. 5, note 9.
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torn up by his roots."89

Attlee was the man of compromise

and, as a result, he managed to maintain a party which ap
peared to be relatively cohesive, thus increasing the party’s
power as a whole at the expense of concessions to factions in
the party.

Gaitskell's policy was the opposite, he refused

to compromise.

His tenure as party leader exacerbated the

most serious rift that had ever occurred within Labour's
ranks.

The personality of a leader can be decisive in

policy formation and party cohesiveness.
The central phases of the conflict were marked by the
general elections of 1951, 1955, and 1959.

When elections

were at its doorstep the party made an effort to plaster over
the cracks and put up a united front, but each time it went
down to defeat the conflict would rise again to its full
height.

70

Bevan led a strong faction which had representa

tives from all the most important sectors of the party.

The

chief figures were Wilson, Crossman, Driberg, Mikardo,
Barbara Castle and, of course, Bevan himself.

Further, sup

port was strong among such unions as the Engineers and the
Shop and Distributive workers, and the constituency parties
lent a strong contingent.

Although support was somewhat less

in the PLP than at Conference, the Left could usually count
on from one quarter to one fifth of all MPs and on important

69 Hunter, p. 19.
70 For a detailed historical account of the party split
in the 1950s see Hunter and Carl F. Brand, The British Labour
Party (Stanford, 1964), pp. 267-297*
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issues this could be raised to almost half.^^
Robert Michels submitted the theory of the iron law of
oligarchy, which can in certain respects be considered sub
stantially correct.

But a look at the Labour party during

the period under study suggests that the horizontal split
between leadership and mass membership, which Michels sug
gested was the norm, may in fact be an abnormal occurrence.^^
In fact, the Labour party's history suggests a vertical
split which results from the competition of elites within the
party, whose ties with MPs and members generally are stronger
than those enjoyed with other segments of the leadership. The
story of the Labour party during these crisis years presents
a picture of competing factions; one of which was heavily re
presented on the Parliamentary Committee, as well as in the
remaining sectors of the party, and the other, with substan
tial support in the PLP and the mass organization, occupying a
73

position of seeming opposition to the Parliamentary Committee.'-^

71 For instance, on Feb. 23/54 the Parliamentary Party
agreed by a vote of 113 to 109 to support German rearmament.
A motion opposing German rearmament introduced by Wilson lost
by a vote of 109-111. See S.H. Beer, p. 221.
72 Robert Michels, Political Parties (New York, 1962).
73 The fact that the Parliamentary Committee was over
whelmingly composed of moderates and revisionists should not
suggest that a Labour cabinet would follow the same pattern.
The Parliamentary Committee is elected by MPs and a majority
of them consistently place moderates on the front benches.
Once in office, however, the party leader chooses his cabinet
with an eye to maximizing his support and as a result, the
Left gains significant though minority representation.
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Although the revisionists were usually able to gain majority
support, this was done only by means of substantial conces
sions to leftist views.
The theory that there is a leadership-membership split
in the Labour party is usually accompanied by the argument
that the parliamentary leadership by using trade union sup
port is able to assure passage of its policies both in the
PLP and at Conference.?^

But over the period under considera

tion, the trade unions did not form a cohesive bloc; rather
they were divided in their support.

Elitist analysis dis

torts several factors, the most important of which is the
fact that Aneurin Bevan, whether on the Parliamentary Commit
tee or not, was a member of the highest echelon of party
leadership, and with his associates was extremely influential
in a number of different sectors of the party.
The conflict did not consist in a struggle between
elites but in the clash of two currents of opinion,
each running strongly throughout the party. During
the Bevanite period the conflict was exacerbated
by 'A ferocious struggle for the succession.' But
the clash of opinion had already begun before
Bevan made his bid for power and it rose to new
heights of intensity after Bevan had made his peace
with Gaitskell in 1957.
The initiative in conduct
ing the conflict was not monopolized by the leader
ship of the respective factions, but was widely
diffused in the various sectors and at various
levels of the party - not only at Conference, but

74 See particularly Jean Blondel, Voters. Parties and
Leaders ; the Social Fabric of British Politics (Harmondsworth,
1 963)," p p . I 5I-I 52, and R.T. McKenzie, British Political
Parties (London, 1955).
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on theJLEC, PLP and Parliamentary Committee as
well.??

The Party Conference
In theory, Conference is the supreme policy making organ
of the party.

While the vast majority of pluraliste, as well

as elitists, would reject this view and, although numerous
commentators on the British political scene, both analytical
and historical, show that this is not the case, the myth per
sists among certain sectors of the Labour party.

Yet it can

be argued that the mood of Conference can play its role in
affecting party policy.

The important fact here is that

Conference decisions are binding in the sense that they should
not be contravened.?8

The NEC is by no means assured of an

absolute majority at Conference and, therefore, in formula
ting its policy submissions it must take into account the mood
of Conference.

Although there are no means by which Conference

can make the NEC accept its decisions, since the latter could
not go on indefinitely facing a hostile Conference and since,
on the other hand, it could not be publicly forced to change
its position in deference to Conference, the only real alter-

75 S.H. Beer, p. 232. For historical accounts of the
major policy disputes, see Henry Polling, A Short History of
The Labour Party (London, 1965), Leslie Hunter, The Road to
Brighton Pier, Carl F. Brand, The British Labour Party, S.H.
Beer, British Politics in the Collectivist Age and Ivor BulmerThomas, The Growth of the British Party System (London, 1965).
76 Saul Rose, "Policy Decision in Opposition," Political
Studies. IV, no. 2 (June, 1956), 130.
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native once informai pre-Conference means have been ex
hausted is to secure support for a policy by compromise.
While the McKenzie thesis concerning Conference-NEC
relationships is in part true, he overstates his case. Even
if the thesis demonstrates that Conference cannot force its
policies down the throat of the leadership, this does not
prove that the Labour party in its organization, is basical
ly similar to its Conservative counterpart.

The party lead

ership is not prepared to accept defeat on the floor, as a
continuance of defeats on important Issues could not help,
but rather, undermine its support at Conference, among the
PLP, and among the electorate.
ful to prepare its

victories."??

"Normally the NEC is care
One of the most important

means at hand to accomplish this is a policy of compromise.
Even if all other arguments are dismissed. Conference still
retains a degree of influence simply because many delegates
refuse to accept the theory that it is impotent.

The Labour

party is forced to work within a system in which all major
items and policies will be discussed and on which a vote will
be taken.

The necessity of discussing policy issues in pub

lic forces the leadership to try to obtain as impressive a
majority as possible.

As long as the Labour tradition con

cerning Conference is such as it was in the 1950s, and as
long as issues must be aired in public, the leadership is

77 Martin Harrison, Trade Unions and the Labour Party
Since 194-5 (London, I960), p. 204.
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going to continually concern itself with obtaining the sup
port of as large a section of the party as is reasonably
possible.
Of the two most important groupings at Conference, the
unions and the constituency organizations, the unions refuse
to accent adverse Conference decisions in matters that con
cern them directly.

And on the most important industrial

questions, such as wages and the conditions of work, dis
cussion is barred by mutual consent.

This gives the unions

a greater freedom of manoeuvre and isolates them, in this
respect, from the glare of publicity.

Nevertheless, it has

not been the habit of the unions to abstain on matters of
concern to the constituency organizations, such as discipline
and organization.

But they do tend to leave the initiative

on major issues to the leadership on the Conference floor.
Yet the leadership itself goes to great pains in order to
assure itself of adequate support on the floor by means of
prior private consultation with the heads of the major unions,
thus barring the chance of defeat and the appearance of being
out of step with the membership.

What significant trade

union interference there was in the 1952-55 period was the
result of fear on the part of Deakin and other right-wing ,
trade unionists that the danger from the Bevanites was so
serious that intervention was mandatory.
The agenda from which the Conference works seems to be
extremist and suggests a leftist rank, and file.

Union par-
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ticlpatlon is insignificant compared with the constituencies,
as unions usually turn for policy leads to the TUC and fur
ther, they usually have their say before Conference when the
NEC is looking for a means to secure its majority.

In addi

tion, the unions are heavily represented on the NEC.
A substantial number of unions vote fairly consistently
with the leftists in the constituencies.

Among them are the

Electrical Trades Union, the Fire Brigades Union, and the
Foundry Workers.

They were able to add considerable support

to leftists in the constituences.
Up to 1956, 2.8 million votes regularly supported
the NEC, 1.8 million were solidly on the left, and
one million were unpredictable ... Since 1956 the
blocks of left and right
wing union
voteshave
been even less cohesive.
Conference votes consistently

show this trend. However,

are a substantial number of unions

which

submit

at Conference, most of them being relatively small.

there

no resolutions
Some of

the larger unions, particularly the National Union of Mineworkers and the National Union of General and Municipal
Workers, put down what might be called 'loyal resolutions',
some of them even being initiated by the N E C . 7 9
Since the constituencies use about one third of the
Conference time, and the unions somewhat less than half that.

78 Ibid.. p. 230. For an analysis of the position of
individual trade unions on major policy issues during the
post-war period see pp. 195-261.
79 A significant portion of the above discussion has been
based on Harrison's book.
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the myth grew that the unions were conservative and the
constituencies radical, this representing the great division
in the party.

Upon analysis, this view proves to be dras

tically oversimplified.

A study by Richard Rose done in 1962

states:
The analysis immediately reveals that the descrip
tion of local parties as a force constantly pres
sing extremist views upon national party leaders
is false ... constituency parties are nearly as
apt to be voicing views derived from general cul
tural values or from interest group links as they
are to voice those clearly associated with a par
tisan ideology.oO
The following table illustrates this.
Table 2
Total Scores of Labour Constituency Resolutions^^

Year

Left

1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
I960

123
109
127
173
152
209

98
119
140
89
73
91

5
5
4
6
3
12

198
169
172
160
186
216

443

893
34

610
23

35
1

1101
42

2639
100

Total No.
Percent

Partisan

Right

Non-Partisan

Total
424
402
428
4l4
528

Source: Richard Rose, "The Political Ideas of English Party
Activists", The American Political Science Review,
LVI, (June, 1962)7 364.

80 Richard Rose, "The Political Ideas of English Party
Activists," The American Political Science Review. LVI,
no. 2 (June, 1962), 364.
81 Partisan is defined as the "enumeration of an agreed
party policy which is opposed to that of the other party and
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Somewhat less than one quarter of the constituency
organizations press partisan views consistently as the fol
lowing table indicates.
Table 3
Partisanship in Labour Constituencies

Category
No partisan
Low (12.5 Average (4l
High (above

No.
resolutions
hO%) partisanship
- 75%) partisanship
75^) partisanship

8?

Percent

88
83
208

18
17
4-2

113

23

Source: Richard Rose, "The Political Ideas of English Party
Activists", The American Political Science Review.
LVI, (June, 1962), 3647"
Partisanship, since it reflects only differences in attitudes
between the Labour and other parties, is not a factor in
party cohesiveness except as a possible positive force.

By

definition, the leadership would share the attitudes put forth
in the resolutions.

On the other hand, ideological extremism

might be a significant factor in lessening cohesion in the
party but Rose's findings indicate that this is not nearly as
widespread as is sometimes thought.

which has an ideological basis." Non-partisan is defined as
"the enumeration of a policy which is not the subject of con
troversy along party lines." See Rose, p. 362.

82 Constituencies presenting only a single resolution
and that partisan are omitted.
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Table 4
Extremism in Labour Parties®^

Category

No.

No extremist resolutions
Low extremism (20# or less)
Average (25 - 50#) extremism
High (above 50#) extremism

191
47
172

Percent

38
9
35
18

87

Source: Richard Rose, "The Political Ideas of English Party
Activists", The American Political Science Review,
LVI, (June, 1962), 336.
The findings show that only one extremist resolution
will be brought to the floor per constituency every six years.
Further examination shows that pressure and interest group
ties were far stronger in a significant number of areas than
were ideological or even simple partisan ones.®^

With regard

to education, welfare services, transport and pensions, lack
of partisan and extremist positions was particularly notice
able as the table on page 69 shows.
It seems there was considerable diversity and flexibili
ty in the attitudes of party activists.

Simply because they

were interested and active, is not cause enough to label them
extremists.

It is in comparison with the apathy of the trade

unions, a very small percentage of whose members took part in
party and Conference activities, that the constituency parties

83 Ibid.
84 Rose, p. 366.
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Table 5
Topics for Labour Resolutions

Topic

Left

Partisan

Foreign policy,defence 594
Economic affairs
117
10
Housing and land
14
Party organization
Pensions
2
Welfare services
9
Education
17
Commonwealth & colonies
8
Local government
7
Socialist principles
57
4
Transportation
Party unity
18
Industrial relations
6
Miscellaneous
32

145
l4l
85
4
1
31
19
82
43
15
3
2
13
26

NonPartisan

Right
14
10

20
188
80
130
143
94
64
1
44
5
56
31

-

1
-

3
2
-

1
-

-

4

245

To ta:

773

456
175
148
146
132
100

94
94
79
63
52

19
306

Source: Richard Rose, "The Political Ideas of English Party
Activists," The American Political Science Review.
LVI, (June, 1962), 367.
appear to be extremely partisan.

In fact, if the left-wing

activists had to rely solely on the support they could muster
among the constituency parties, support for their resolutions
would be insignificant.

In I960, constituency members con

trolled only thirteen percent of the vote.

This had declined

for some years from seventeen percent in 1952.

85

other votes are controlled by the trade unions.

Almost all
It should be

clear that the ideological lines in the party were vertical

85 These figures are taken from Leon D. Epstein, "Who
Makes Party Policy: British Labour 1960-61," Midwest Journal
of Political Science. VI, no. 2 (May, 1962), 167.
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and not horizontal; although certain views tended to prevail
in one sector of the party to a greater degree than they did
in others.

This, however, is simply a function of time and

place.
Over the span of its history there has been a tendency
on the part of the party to move away from the left.

But

tradition can still be an important variable exercising a
restraining influence on the public expression of policy which
is notably right-wing.

As a result, the leadership tended to

be closer to the middle in the party than often seemed to be
the case.

Although certain major unions had occasion to dis

agree with the policies of the NEC, a number of unions are
more than likely to a c q u i e s c e . H o w e v e r , about twelve unions
usually found themselves on the extreme left; a few of these
were under a degree of Communist influence, their leadership
being forced to take extreme positions in order to maintain
o f f i c e . D u r i n g the Bevanite period, fairly consistent sup
port was given by the moderate left to the Bevanites.

But

the dissolution of the revolt gave way to a somewhat more

86 The National Union of Dyers, Bleachers and Textile
Workers, the National Society of Pattern Workers, the Pruden
tial Staff unions, the National Association of Theatrical and
Kine Employees and the Scottish Baker's union.

87 The Electrical Trades Union, the National Union of
Vehicle Builders, the Constructional Engineering Union, the
Amalgamated Union of Foundry Workers, the National Society of
Metal Mechanics, the United Society of Boilermakers, Ship
builders and Structural Workers, the Chemical Worker's Union,
The Tobacco Workers union and the Fire Brigades union.
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flexible attitude.

Other unions, such as the Post Office

Workers, have floated continually between opposition and
support of the NEC.^^
It was the Transport and General Workers Union, under
Frank Cousins, that first brought home the fact that the NEC
could not be assured of a majority at Conference.

Therefore,

official policy had to be shaped in such a way as to obtain
at a minimum, a bare majority.

Of trie six largest unions in

the TUC, it was invariable that two or three should be found
in the opposition ranks.

The unions have always had a pro

gressive element, but not to the same extent as the constitu
ency parties.

It was the very fact of division in the unions

that enabled the Left to muster the degree of support it did,
and thus to compel the leadership, on numerous occasions, to
adjust its policy accordingly.

The Parliamentary Party and the Leadership
The PLP assumes a far greater role in policy formation
than does Conference; and the leadership must carefully weigh
the strength of various factions and tendencies when formula
ting party policy.

However, to fully understand the process

it is best to begin with an analysis of the positions and

88 The Amalgamated Engineering Union, the National Union
of Railwayman, the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied
Workers, the National Union of Furniture Trade Operatives,the
Plumbing Trades Union,the Association of Engineering and Ship
building Draughtsmen and the National Union of Tailors and
Garment Workers.
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attitudes of the members of the PLP, the Labour MPs.

In

attempting to ascertain attitudes, the division lists are of
no use because of the effectiveness of whipping.

However,

Early Day motions (EDMs) are available for analysis.

They are

"spontaneous unwhipped backbench manifestos"®^ which any MP
can table, and to which any can add their names in support.
The freedom to sign a backbench manifesto is the same as the
freedom to ask questions.

However, from 1952 to 1959, the

Labour whips had to be informed of a members intention to
table such a motion.

But the motions were regarded as the

exclusive right of the backbencher.

The EDMs indicate what

views backbenchers have freely committed themselves to; but .
the haphazard method employed to collect signatures may well
affect the degree of professed support.

Nevertheless, the

results of the tests show that there is a highly significant
correlation between the type of member and the views expressed.
Frontbenchers and whips were exluded because they were not in
a position to freely express their opinion.

Therefore, of the

277 Labour MPs, only 236 were classified as backbenchers.
The type of member was determined by the use of three
main categories: occupation, education and sponsorship.

89 3.E. Finer, H.B. Berrington and D.J. Bartholomew,
Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons (London, I 96I), p.
7 . This excellent study is the only one of its type avail
able but it is unfortunately confined to the life of the
1955-1959 Parliament. However, the authors maintain that
attitudes in tne 1951-55 Parliament were very similar to
those of their successor, p. I 3I.
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Occupation was broken down into three groupings: workers
(including full time union officials, of whom there were 79
or 33 percent), the professions (including lawyers, doctors
and teachers, of whom there were 73 or 31 percent) and the
miscellaneous occupations (a residuary category composed of
various white collar workers, such as publishers. Journal
ists and party organizers, for whom politics was the chief
activity, and of whom there were 61 or 26 percent).
Sponsorship was similarly broken down into three groupings.
Seventy eight or 30 percent of the backbenchers were spon
sored by the trade unions, 21 or 9 percent were sponsored by
the co-operatives, and 137 or ^8 percent were sponsored by
the constituency organizations.

Educational groupings were:

elementary (77 or 32 percent of the members), secondary (58
or 25 percent), and university (93 or 39 percent).
Two wings emerged: working class and professional, with
the miscellaneous occupations in the centre having character
istics similar to both.

Using sponsorship as a category, nine

percent of the professions were sponsored by the trade unions,
5^ by the constituencies, and 2k by the co-operatives.

Re

garding trade unionists, 80 percent were sponsored by the
trade unions, and ten percent each by the co-operatives and
the constituencies.

The miscellaneous occupations were the

90 The Labour party has a fourth occupational category,
businessmen. But it so small that it was left out of the
general analysis; however, its exclusion tends to distort some
of the figures.
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most highly represented in the co-operative groups with 52
percent, while six percent were sponsored by the trade unions
and 33 percent by the constituencies.
Regarding education, 71 percent of the trade unionists
had elementary schooling, 27 percent secondary, and one percent
university.

Seventeen percent of the miscellaneous occupations

had elementary schooling, ^6 percent secondary, and 22 percent
university.

In the professions, eight percent received only

elementary education, eight percent secondary and 67 percent
university.

Of the workers, then, the bulk had only elementary

schooling; of the miscellaneous occupations, the bulk had sec
ondary; and of the professions, the bulk had university.

From

this it is possible to conclude that the correspondence between
occupation and education tended to be close.
o

Several major policy Issues will be discussed below.
Foreign policy, and in particular, attitudes towards the hydro
gen bomb and pacifism will be dealt with first. The table on the
following page serves to illustrate attitudes towards the latter.
The correlation between occupation and pacifism indicated
that the miscellaneous occupations were the most leftist and
that the workers and professions had views which tended to be
both right-wing and similar.

Analysis of sponsorship group

ings indicated that those sponsored by the co-operatives were
the most pacifist and that those sponsored by the trade unions
and the constituencies held views that tended to coincide.
There was no significant correlation in the general occupa
tional categories; but those who graduated from Redbrick
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T a b le

6

Backbench Labour Views on Pacifism and the Hydrogen Bomb

Category

No.

Left: unilateral renunciation of tests and/
or manufacturing of the bomb

45

19

Centre: those not in the category above but
opposing American hydrogen bomb pat
rols and/or missile bases

68

29

Right: those in neither of the above cate
gories but favoring disarmament

82

35

Uncommitted: those expressing none of the
previous attitudes

41

17

236

100

Percent

Source: S.E. Finer et al. Backbench Opinion in the House of
Commons (London, 1961), p. 26.
universities tended to support pacifism while those from
Oxbridge tended to oppose it.
On German rearmament, 44- MPs could be classified as leftwing, l44 as centre, and 86 as right, while 62 failed to ex
press any opinion.

The only type classification in which a

relationship could be established was sponsorship. Co-operativesponsored MPs tended to be left, constituency-sponsored, centre,
and trade union-sponsored, right.

There was, in addition, a

close correlation of views between the German rearmament issue
and pacifism.
percent.
isra.

The overlap of leftists on these issues was 60

There were five motions dealing with anti-colonial-

The Left was here defined as being composed of those who

signed three or more motions, that is, 28 MPs, the centre as
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those who signed two motions (48), the right as those who
signed one motion (103), while a further 103 refrained from
signing.

The miscellaneous occupations were again the most

radical, the workers the least, while the professions stood
midway.

Co-operative and constituency members were equally

left-wing, while trade union members occupied the right end
of the scale.

Education was not a significant variable on

colonial matters.
On civil liberties, 27 MPs signed three or more motions
which placed them on the left, 48 signed two motions which
placed them in the centre, 68 signed only one which placed
them on the right, while 93 signed no motions.

But a good

case can be made for the argument that uncommitted members
tended to stand further to the right than those who signed
the motions, thus pushing the whole scale to the left.
Educational analysis revealed that those with secondary
education were the most enthusiastic, that university gradu
ates stood midway, and that those with elementary education
were the most conservative.

The remaining two categories

were not significant as far as their relationship with the
issue was concerned.
Humanitarian issues revealed a similar split, with 45
MPs signing three or four motions and thus falling into the
left-wing category, 84 signing two motions and thus falling
into the centre grouping, 73 signing only one and thus being
placed on the right, while 34 MPs signed no motions and were,
therefore, categorized as uncommitted.

In the occupational
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groupings, the miscellaneous occupations were the furthest
left, the professions were in the centre, while workers
occupied a position on the right.

In the sponsorship group

ings, the co-operators were the most enthusiastic, the con
stituency members were split between left and centre, and
the right was occupied by members sponsored by the trade
unions.

Education did not prove to be a significant variable

91

With regard to social welfare, in general, those signing
five or six motions, of whom there were 45, were categorized
as very keen, those signing three or four motions, of whom
there were 80, were categorized as keen, those signing one or
two motions, of whom there were 8 l , were categorized as mod
erate, while 25 MPs registered no opinion.

As could be ex

pected, the trade union sponsored members were strongest in
support, the constituency sponsored members stood at the
opposite extreme, while the co-operative sponsored members
stood midway, half being keen and very keen and the other
half moderate.

The educational split followed expected lines.

Those with only elementary education were the most keen, those
with university education the least keen, and those with sec
ondary education were themselves split, some being keen or
very keen, some being moderate.
The table on page 78 helps to clarify the above by show
ing the correlation between attitudes in the PLP.

91 All figures on backbench attitudes are taken from
Finer; the H-bomb and pacifism, pp. 23-28; foreign affairs,
pp. 28-38; anti-colonialsim, pp. 38-40; civil liberties, pp.
aO-43; humanitarianism, pp. 43-44; and social welfare, pp.
44-48.
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T a b le

7

Correlation Between Attitudes in the Labour Party

Humanitar 1.00
ian] sra
Civil
liberties
Foreign
policy
Anti-colo
nialism
Pacifism

92

0.41

0.32

0.30

0.35

0.21

0.22

0.13

1.00

0.36

0.30

0.33

0.25

0.22

0.15

1.00

0.36

0.39

0.23

0.27

0.21

1.00

0.32

0.19

0.20

0.09

1.00

0.3^

0.19

0.21

1.00

0.33

0.29

1.00

0.33

Welfare
Cost of
living
Health &
education

1.00
H

CL

FP

A-C

P

w

CL

H&E

Source: S.E. Finer et al. Backbench Opinion in the House of
Commons (London, 1961), p. 56.
As can be seen there is a strong correlation between
some attitudes.

The closer any two items stand on the scale,

the closer is the correlation between the two.

If a member

was placed opposite the issue about which he felt strongest,
the probability is that his next greatest concern would have
been the item immediately above or below.

As he progressed

up or down the scale, the intensity of feeling would have
tended to diminish.

It is impossible to measure attitudes

92 Two important areas, nationalization and egalitarian
ism do not figure in the analysis as no motions were tabled
on either topic.
The letters on the horizontal scale represent
the same issues, in the same order, as those on the vertical
scale.
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in absolute terms; all that is dealt with are tendencies.
There is no means of weighing the intensity of radicalism for
any one member, when one compares one area with another. Thus,
while a member might appear to have been equally left on two
given issues according to the EDM analysis, the intensity of
feeling may have been much greater in one case than in the
other.
Trade unionists tended to be right-wing on every ideolo
gical issue and radical on every material

i s s u e .

^3

They

formed a separate and relatively cohesive group in the House,
where elementary education, trade union sponsorship and oc
cupation tended to coincide.

The professions and those with

university education largely coincided and on material issues,
the professions were at the opposite end from the workers. On
pacifism their attitude was the same as the workers, while on
all other issues their position was in the middle of the
scale.

The miscellaneous occupations were a counterweight to

the workers; on material issues they took the same stand as
the professions except on the high cost of living, which was
in part, the result of the ideological phrasing of the motions.
On every ideological issue the miscellaneous occupations were
left-wing.
The party is, broadly speaking, polarized on ideo
logical matters between the left-wing Miscellane
ous Occupations and the right-wing Workers. With

93 The issues classed as ideological are: humanitarian
ism, civil liberties, foreign policy, anti-colonialism and
pacifism; those classed as material are: welfare, cost of
living and health and education.
Finer, p. 57*
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the Professions mainly taking the middle view;
and on material matters between the left-wing
Workers and the right-wing Professions and
Miscellaneous Occupations.94Sponsorship groupings show that the position of those
members sponsored by the trade unions was similar to that of
the workers.

This was because of the 80 percent overlap.

Eighty percent of the constituency members belonged to the
miscellaneous occupations and professions.

But their posi

tion tended to be similar to that of the professions; on
material issues they were always right-wing and on ideolo
gical issues they shifted.

Co-operative sponsored members

showed no high degree of correlation either with occupational
or educational groupings; although ten out of twenty one co
operative sponsored members belonged to the miscellaneous
occupations, and tended to be more radical than the others.
Those with only elementary school were almost solely
trade union sponsored members who were on the right on all
ideological matters and on the left on all material issues.
University education overlapped with both the miscellaneous
occupations and the professions.

Such members tended to be

on the right on material issues.

But there were numerous

variations on ideological issues.

The grammar schools pro

duced more radical MPs than did the public schools, as did
the Redbrick universities in comparison with Oxbridge.
On material issues the impetus for action came from
members sponsored by the trade unionists, workers, and those

94 Ibid., pp. 62-63
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with elementary school education.

If these are all brought

together they total 120, or one half of the backbench. This,
however, is the outside limit; the core totals about 55
members.

These members were simultaneously sponsored by the

trade unions, were workers, and had only an elementary or
secondary education.

When ideology was concerned, this group

tended to be right-wing.

Here its chief opposition stemmed

from members sponsored by the co-operative societies who be
longed to the miscellaneous occupations and had secondary
school and/or Redbrick university training.
gether, the total reaches 85.

When brought to

Of the 13 backbench Labour

revolts in the 194-5-55 period, the average number of partici
pants was about 50, although over 200 members were connected
with at least one of the

i n c i d e n t s .

professions seemed decisive.

The attitude of the

Whoever they sided with tended

to gain a majority on the backbench; and therefore with uni
lateralism the correspondence of views between the trade
unionists and professions was almost identical.

But with

regard to such matters as anti-colonialism, the professions
have tended to support the views of the miscellaneous
occupations.
There were several trends which began to appear in the
period under study that may become significant.

Although

95 See Peter G. Richards, Honourable Members : A Study of
the British Backbencher (London, 1959), pp. Ï4-7-148 for more
detailed information.
96 Finer, pp. 74-75.
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following the war there was a rise in the number of candi
dates sponsored by the trade unions, many such candidates
were not workers.

Further, the number of working class mem

bers with safe seats declined and the number with marginal
seats increased.

Partial explanations lie in the facts that

the unions are unwilling to contest other than safe seats
and that the increased strength of the constituency parties
made it harder for trade unionists to win nominations.

One

of the main difficulties is that the trade unions are not
willing to sponsor men that have the qualifications the
Constituency Labour Parties (CLPs) are looking for. Although
the trade union leadership could provide the CLPs with the
type of members that would benefit it, the unwillingness of
such officials to leave their trade union posts precludes
this on an extensive

s c a l e .

97

This results in a tendency

for the professions and the miscellaneous occupations to in
crease their membership in the PLP.

There is a further tend

ency for trade union members to be older and to have entered
the House at an earlier date than members in the other group
ings.

Age was not a significant factor as far as material

issues went.

But on certain ideological matters there was a

tendency for younger members to be more radical, indicating
that in the future such matters as anti-colonialism and
q

humanitarianism are likely to receive a wider range of support.

97 Harrison, pp. 262-306, provides an extensive analysis
of the problem.
98 Finer, pp. 72-73*

.
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Comparatively little can be done on the floor of the
House to influence policy decisions.

Concerning the forma

tion of a cabinet, Herbert Morrison stated;
There is a tendency, therefore, for the leading
and most influential members of the party to find
a place, and even for the deliberate inclusion of
varying political temperaments and approaches pro
vided there are fair prospects of their being able
to work together, in order that the maximum good
will of all elements of the parliamentary party
may be obtained ...In a sense the two great parties
are each coalitions of opinion within themselves.99
The same principle applies to a party in opposition.

To go

to the polls with divided ranks, particularly if the other
party were able to present a stronger and more cohesive image,
would be to invite defeat.

It is far easier for the Con

servative party to do this because of the amount of deference
afforded the party leader and the higher degree of concern
for the attainment and maintenance of office.

This, again in

creases the necessity of Labour making significant efforts to
increase cohesion.

A Parliamentary Committee or cabinet

which attempted to drive its policies down the throats of its
backbenchers would, before long, be faced with a significant
degree of discontent and resentment which might culminate in
a backbench revolt.

This spirit of discontent, Morrison

maintains, flows back to the constituency parties, where it
dampens enthusiasm and hinders co-operation.

This was specif

ically the case in the months preceding the- 1951 electoral
campaign.

This,factor played its part in the electoral de-

99 Herbert Morrison,- Government and Parliament (London,
1964), p. 43.
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feat of that year.
There are numerous channels through which the leadership
is made aware of backbench feeling.

Meetings between minis

ters and members are frequent; appointments can be arranged
with ministers; conversations can take place in the environs
of the House; the whips and the EDMs keep the front benches
informed of the attitudes of members; and discussions in the
subject committees of the party are influential.

Influence

on policy is generally organized in a more subtle way than
change on the floor of the House.

The leadership usually

tries to anticipate party reaction before policy is made pub
lic, and adjust it, if it feels it can,

a c c o r d i n g l y .

Michael Foot, one of the Left’s chief spokesmen, stated;
The Labour MP who seeks to change or effect great
decisions must persuade his colleagues in the
secret conclave of the party meeting. True, he
will have had the chance of pressing his view at
an earlier meeting of a specialized official
group. But if his powers of advocacy fail there
or if the political crisis in which he is con
cerned breaks suddenly, as most important crises
do, it is in the party meeting - not the floor of
the House of Commons - that he will have the only
opportunity to determine action.101
The Political Correspondent of the Times said in a June 27,
i 960 article that "this [the backbench committee)

is where

things are being said and done that are more politically
meaningful than a great deal that passes in the Chamber it

100 The most extensive discussion of this type of in
fluence available is in Richards, pp. 90-142.
101 Quoted in Finer, p. 3*
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self."

He maintained that to prove this empirically would

be fascinating but then added that it was "humanly impossible.
Privacy is the essence of the backbench committee system."1^2
Parties must be sharply distinguished in two facets of
their operations; as electoral machines and as policy making
institutions.

Differences within parties are often just as

important as differences between parties.

This is certainly

the case in twentieth-century British political history. The
strongest intraparty divisions have usually been vertical,
not horizontal.

Three elements can be isolated within the

Labour party when this line of reasoning is pursued; factions,
tendencies and non-aligned partisans.1^3

^ faction is defined

as a "group of individuals based on representatives in Parlia
ment who seek to further a broad range of policies through
consciously organized political a c t i v i t y . A

faction is

a definite grouping which serves to bring direct influence to
bear on the policy making process.

A tendency refers to cer

tain attitudes spanning a large area of policy objectives
which are joined by a general view of society.

The number of

supporters of a tendency on any given issue will vary, and
there is never any self-conscious organization.

Non-aligned

partisans tend to support the general principles of the party

102 Ibid.. p. 4
103 The ensuing analysis has been adopted from Richard
Rose, "Parties, Factions and Tendencies in Britain," Political
Studies. XII, no. 1 (Feb., 1964), 33-46.
104 Ibid.
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rather than those of any specific subgroup within it.

It is

these non-aligned partisans that the factions and tendencies
attempt to mobilize in support of their policy objectives
when differences within the party became significant. Policy
parties are neither totally factions or tendencies; instead,
the two tend to combine to become the former.

Thus, the

Bevanite faction often relied on the support of those with
leftist tendencies.

These policy parties do not tend to

operate regularly.

Instead, they come to the fore as co

hesiveness diminishes.
The chief features of the policy party, parti
cularly a consciously organized faction, appear
to be an ideology, leadership, limited technical
expertise, cadres, a communications network, and
rewards whether material or psychological.
During the Bevanite period the left-wing faction held regular
meetings with an agenda and minutes, conducted political in
formation campaigns through its own periodicals, and held re
gular meetings in the constituencies.

Further, because

factions were particularly strong in the Labour party, the
support of non-aligned partisans gained increased importance.
Their support of lack of it was often the decisive factor in
policy disputes.
Accuracy of information is of vital importance if the
leadership is going to be able to balance the factions with
any degree of success and this, in turn, limits the leadership's
freedom of action.

In addition, personality influences the

105 Ibid.. p. 39.
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degree to which a leader will head a united front,

Attlee

began his career as a very weak leader and usually exercised
a degree of deference to Cripps and Bevin.

His personal

authority tended to increase when both of the above left
office in 1951*
diminished.

But by 1955, when he retired, it had again

Gaitskell, in contrast to Attlee, who had

usually attempted to arrange some type of compromise, assumed
office as the leader of a faction.

This combination of roles

led to a number of bitterly divisive struggles.
A last possible source of policy is the NEC, which is
theoretically the administrative arm of Conference.

Professor

McKenzie claims that it is heavily influenced by the trade
unions and that as long as the parliamentary leadership re
tains the confidence of the trade union leaders they will have
no difficulty controlling the policy recommendations of the
N E C . 30®

Again it appears that McKenzie’s analysis is slight

ly oversimplified.
are trade unionists.

The NEC consists of 26 members, 12 of whom
But there is no guarantee that all trade

unionists will support the leadership.

Although, if the pat

tern of policy decisions in the PLP is any indication, it
would be safe to assume that there would be a strong tendency
for the majority, at a minimum, to do so.
The relationship between the PLP and the NEC tends to
fluctuate but there is seldom open conflict.

The constitution

states :

106 McKenzie, pp. 519-524.
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The National Executive Committee and the Execu
tive Committee of the PLP shall decide which
items from the Party Programme shall be included
in the Manifesto which shall be issued by the
NEC prior to the General Election.107
The NEC has a majority here.

This is not to say that the

PLP is subservient to it or that the NEC is more important
than the PLP, but simply that the relationship is not always
simple.

Although the PLP is doubltess the focal point for

policy when Parliament is sitting, when in recess the NEC
plays a larger role as it usually meets every month.

Some

commentators have argued that when the PLP has been dead
locked the NEC tended to intervene.!®®

If a policy question

arises in parliament, it has been the custom to leave its
determination to the PLP.

If questions are raised concerning

this policy in the NEC the party leader or deputy leader who
are both ex-officio members of the NEC, usually present a
defence and explanation of the policy and it is left at that.
There are occasions, however, when the NEC can exert a degree
of independent influence, as in the case of German rearmament.
But it might be correct to argue that the areas of independent
policy initiative left to the NEC are few and that, since the
composition of both the NEC and PLP, as far as policy attitudes
go, is usually very similar, the likelihood of divergent and
irreconcilable opinions emerging is small.

When divergent

107 Rose, p. 134.
108 The bulk of the following analysis is adopted from
Saul Rose, "Policy Decision in Opposition". Political Studies.
IV, no. 2 (June, 1956), I 28-I 38 .
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opinions do emerge they are not usually on matters of funda
mental policy and can therefore be easily reconciled.
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CONCLUSION

After World War I, the Labour party made a series of
decisions that resulted in a full-scale commitment to the
achievement of the Socialist Commonwealth; equality and fra
ternity were to be sought through the public ownership and
control of the means of production.

The environment in which

such a transformation could take place had been developing
throughout the last half of the nineteenth and the early part
of the twentieth century.

Although the party was pluralistic

there were unified core views that gave it a degree of unity
which persisted into the post-World War II era.

Thus,

throughout the inter-war years all troubles could be traced
to one cause: capitalism.

But social reformers fall into a

serious error in assuming that structural changes in society
are accompanied by what they suppose must be necessary
changes in human motivation.

"Men are conceived of as en

tirely rational and endowed with a passion for equality. Free
them from the domination of interests and the degradation of
a social system which bars equality, and you will have a
great outpouring of constructive social

e n d e a v o r .

1®9

This

political naivete was even carried to the extreme by the
Fabians, of considering the possibility of the public owner
ship of the newspapers to ensure objective reporting.

109 Adam Ulam, The Philosophical Foundations of English
Socialism (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), p. 130.
90
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Doubtless, the realization that the above was not the
case played its role in the revisionist reformulation.

Re

visionism has made great inroads into Socialist theory, to
the extent that it is now the dominant theme in British post
war Socialist thought.

This does not mean that other view

points are insignificant, but it does show that fraternity
and public ownership as values in the Labour party are no
longer the most widely accepted core values.

In fact, it

could be argued that core values have been reduced to one:
equality; although revisionist spokesmen do not rule out the
possible value of fraternity and public ownership.
This ideological division resulted in the formation of
two factions within the party which throughout the 1950s con
ducted a struggle for dominance.

Of course, ideological

factors were strongly reinforced by considerations of power;
but this does not detract from the major role played by doc
trine in the conflict.
The nature of the political party as a form of social
organization operating in the British environment necessitates
a significant degree of responsiveness, on the part of the
leadership, to factional demands.

Eastonian analysis, if

adopted, can serve to clarify the general argument. Easton's
recent work, A Systems Analysis of Political Life.^® can be
adopted, with certain important modifications, to the analysis
of political parties and the Labour party in particular. Since

110 (New York, 1965).
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Easton's work is so abstract and general, when an attempt is
made to apply it to a given political party in a given en
vironment many arguments which are particularly relevant when
a broad scope is desired lose their salience.
Demands, Easton argues, can range from very narrow and
specific ones to those which are very broad in scope.

111

These will be directed at those members of the party who those
making the demands believe have the power to satisfy them.
In Labour's case demands are clearly articulated and are
directed towards the leadership in general, and the leader in
particular, by the various factions and tendencies in the
party.

General ideologies or vague preferences are not in

cluded in the term "demand", but these form the basis from
which real demands emanate.

Further, such demands serve a

functional purpose for the leadership, by providing part of
the raw material for policy formation and directing the at
tention of the leadership towards problems of real importance.
Most demands are the result of experience gained in the non
political sphere; whether such demands will be brought into
the political sphere depends on the probability of their being
fulfilled outside it.

Once demands are introduced into the

political system they act as stresses on the party; if they
are not fulfilled support for the leadership and even the

111 Demands are defined as "an expression of opinion that
an authoritative allocation with regard to a particular sub
ject matter should or should not be made by those responsible
for doing so." Ibid., p. 38.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

93

party diminishes.

There are likely to be more demands than

resources; that is, all groups making the demands will not
be able to receive satisfaction because of the limited values
available for allocation.

If the demands of a significant

section of the party are not met consistently, support for
the leadership and the party will be undermined both within
the party and within the system.
A minimum level of support is necessary if the party is
to maintain its position in the system or to have a realis
tic chance of forming the next government, as loss of sup
port in the party affects party morale and undermines public
confidence in the party as a viable institution by question
ing its .ability to govern in a manner comparable to its com
petitor.

If support is persistently below this level, then,

the party’s survival in its existing form is called into
question and steps must be taken to reverse this trend.

The

loss of support for the leadership by party members is a
major cause of stress, and this tends to undermine electoral
strength.

The actions of the leadership play a significant

part in building up or undermining support.

If it cannot or

will not provide adequate output in the form of policy as
called for by significant factions and tendencies, cleavage
will appear and this will result in s t r e s s . W h e n

demands

. 112 Cleavage is defined "either as differences in at
titudes, opinions and ways of life or as conflict among
groups ... attitude cleavage and political cleavage."
Ibid.,
p. 263 .
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are not met support will decline and discontent will mani
fest itself.

Important implications can be drawn from this.

A simple balancing of interests such as that presented by
the group process theorists would satisfy neither of the
major factions; to do this the leadership must swing towards
the revisionists on some issues and towards the fundamental
ists on others so that at least a minimum number of the de
mands of both groups will be satisfied.

Secondly, the

leadership must balance the support and strength gained in
the party, which indirectly contributes to electoral
strength, against the possible loss of support in the centre
of the electoral spectrum when policy becomes too extreme.
Two elements are necessary: compromise with the Left and
compromise with the revisionists and/or that section of the
electorate which gives Labour its margin of victory.

The

degree to which the leadership will lean one way or the
other depends on many factors, one of the most important
being the personality of the members of the top leadership
echelon, as the case of Gaitskell aptly demonstrates.
The greater the degree of internal dissension and con
flict between party members, the greater will be the degree
of cleavage.

Cleavage can become so great that compromise

on output becomes impossible; this is an important factor in
output failure and it destorys support among the electorate.
While this points out, sharpens and eases identification of
differences in demand, it increases both the occurrence and
potentiality for occurrence of conflict.

Cleavage results

in output failure, which produces discontent and stress.
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Competing individuals align themselves with like members and
separate themselves from unlike members, forming factions
and tendencies; and this interferes with the course of com
promise and co-operation.
If the leadership is to take any political demand and
transform it into a policy, and the operation is to be re
latively smooth, the co-operation, or at least the acquies
cence, of the major factions is required.

Cleavage lessens

the probability of a successful transformation from input to
output.

If there is no mechanism for the adjustment of

cleavages in the party, then disintegration will result if
these continue to increase.

Attitudes become excessively

rigid and compromise becomes increasingly improbable.

At

the extreme, there may be no means of agreeing on who should
fill the positions of authority, or it may be felt by the
factions that common membership no longer serves any useful
purpose.
to avoid.

This is a situation which the leadership desires
In addition, the factions compete for loyalty with

the party and this serves to diminish the effectiveness of
and support for the party.
Unless there is an effective means of dealing with
cleavages, stress will increase.
facilitate its decrease.

Changes in structure may

Representation may serve as a tool

to placate members of a faction, and the increased ease with
which the factions can reach power centres facilitates understanding and flexibility.

Representation, formal or informal,

offers an opportunity to solve differences, assuming that
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communication will serve to facilitate a decrease in cleav
age.

Norms may also have a moderating effect on stress if

the factions are convinced they must continue to operate
within the structure.

But most important is demand

satisfaction.
We can expect that direct satisfaction for de
mands will at least generate specific support;
and the longer such satisfactions are felt, the
more likely it is that a higher level of poli
tical goodwill can develop.
If members con
tinually perceive that their demands are being
met on a day-to-day basis, their loyalty to ob
jects can naturally be expected to increase.
As mentioned above, a cancelling out of the desired
policies of the various factions and tendencies in an effort
to balance, as the theorists of the group process maintain,
would not really solve the problem.

And it might, in fact,

hinder the chances of obtaining a greater degree of cohesive
ness.

The leadership would simply be acting as a clerical

staff while, in reality, they adjust demands or put forth
new demands which are intended to gain support in the party
and among the electorate.

The leadership evaluates given

demands but also takes part in the formulation and interpre
tation of demands in the light of which they feel they will
gain maximum utility.

The policies generated and adjusted

by the leadership may have several purposes: the maintenance
of their position vis-a-vis competitors, the increase in
electoral support as part of the struggle for power, or the

113 Ibid.. p. 275.
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ensurance of maximum "benefit for the party.

But whether the

leadership holds one or all of these, it is almost certain
the major factor is the maintenance of a certain level of
support for themselves; and the type of output has the major
influence on this.
As pointed out before, some leaders, for instance Gaitskell, may attempt to maximize support by appealing solely
to the electors who provide the margin of victory, as opposed
to other leaders who would tend to place greater emphasis on
increasing support generally through increasing support among
party members, believing that the level of support among the
electors is a function of the level of support in the party.
If, of course, the outputs are favorable to a given
faction, the leadership will likely go to great lengths to
point out that this is the case, and the member's percep
tions of what is being done for them will influence the de
gree of their support for the leadership.

If the policy

appears to be favorable to certain members, their support
for the leadership will increase; if not, support will re
main static or decrease.

No matter what the real effect,

the leadership is likely to make attempts at persuading the
factions that their demands have been sufficiently met in
the past.

Misperception may be induced by the leadership;

and it may involve symbolic gratification in place of real
outputs.

These methods, however, are likely to be relatively

unsuccessful in Labour's case, given the highly sophisticated
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nature of the society and the party.

In fact, such methods

may tend to irritate members, inducing loss of support. The
relative importance of output is therefore higher than it
would be in other circumstances.
If the leadership cannot maintain a certain degree of
support it will no longer be in a position to attain the
reins of office.

Even men with a substantial degree of

power are not sure how far they can carry their will.
Generally, the holders of power "are reluctant to test their
strength any more frequently than is absolutely essential;
every failure in its use chips away at its future effective
ness".But

historical, social and psychological circum

stances in the political culture and in the environment
influence the degree of responsiveness which tends to be in
almost constant flux.

11^ Ibid.. p. 436.
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